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1 | Introduction
The establishment of a secret transmission is one of the most relevant issues in mo-
dern communications. The growing request and research for increasingly sophistica-
ted security mechanisms to protect the information exchanges gave birth to a variety
of key agreement mechanisms. The expanding technological innovations will bring,
in the near future, the necessity to guarantee the establishment of a secure system
between devices experiencing outstanding spatial separations: the first one being
the satellite communications. These new developing horizons required to merge two
distinct disciplines: the Classical and Quantum Information Theory. Thanks
to the exploitation of Quantum Mechanics laws, and of the concept of photon -an in-
formation bearer with amazing properties- the realization of a secure communication
establishment is possible, and the detection of a malicious entity can be properly
realized. Neverthless, we cannot lose consciousness of the fact that, by increasing
the distance between devices, we have a consequential enlargement of the complica-
tions that the trasmission itself has to dam up: among them, the atmospherical
turbulence problem. For years, the Communication community acted against this
bothering component, with the aim of realizing solutions to combat its effects: over
time, significant results have been presented, nevertheless the problem -and the tur-
bulence itself- still persists. In this work we will expose an innovative and refined
way to allow secure communications even in malevolent situations: the turbulence
will be exploited, thanks to the following criterion: the presence of atmospherical tur-
bulence implies that the channel experienced by the signal exhibits occasional high
gains rather than a constant amplitude. This in turn means that such transmettivity
peaks could be exploited with the aim of improving the quality of our transmission.
This can be done by using a suitable probing signal that will provide the receiver
with the required information about the channel status: we will choose to acquire the
key signal in those instants for which the probe signal lies above a given threshold.
Therefore, we will obtain a preselection of packets, that will be numerically lower,
but at the same time we will experience an improvement on the SNR and on the
quality of the transmission itself: the idea is that the SNR increase should outpace
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6the decrease of the overall counts in a given time. We will show that this expedient
provides some impressive results, in particular for acquisitions with high background
noise conditions: that is, transmissions for which we previously had considerable
limitations regarding the possibility of completing a secret key exchange successfully.
In Chapter 2 we will introduce the basis of Quantum Information Theory: the
first step is an overview of the Information Theory basics, briefly focusing on source
coding and channel coding theorems, and on cardinal concepts such as entropy, mu-
tual information and perfect secrecy. In the second part we will familiarize with
the fundamentals of quantum mechanics, and with the laws that allowed a growing
development of the field of Quantum Cryptography, making it essentially the only
practical tool for physical layer information theoretic security. To close the chapter,
we will focus on Cryptographic Security Mechanisms such as encryption, uncondi-
tionally secure authentication and key agreement; all these topics will be analyzed
in details.
Chapter 3 is devoted to Quantum Key Distribution, that is, a technique that
uses the main principles of quantum mechanics in order to guarantee a secure com-
munication between two parties, generally called Alice and Bob. We will present key
exchange and key distillation, including the crucial phases of sifting, reconciliation,
privacy amplification. This is done with the purpose of agreeing on a common yet
secret key, thus ensuring the confidentiality of communications.
Chapters 4,5 and 6 concern experimental realization of quantum key exchange
across a turbulent free space quantum channel at the Canary Islands and the data
processing and analysis that provide the final results. Specifically, Chapter 4 intro-
duces the theoretical background needed to fully understand the innovative idea of
exploiting the turbulence; we will provide a sound motivation to the intuitions and
the theoretical model underlying this experiment. Chapter 5 is dedicated to the
exposition of the functions implementing the processing of acquired data; a focus on
each function, attempting to provide an overall comprehension to the reader, is thus
proposed. Chapter 6 finally presents the remarkable results that allow us to obtain
some impressive conclusions and to suggest the turbulence exploiting approach as a
possible way to enhance the quality of long-distance communications.
2 | Quantum Information Theory
2.1 Motivation
The outstanding development of network technologies, the persistent growth of scien-
tific and technical knowledge and the increasing demand for systems able to guarantee
the confidentiality and integrity of informations carried across the network, gave rise
to the need for establish new foundation for cryptography science.
This led to the development of Quantum Cryptography, which lies at the inter-
section of two cardinal branches of science, as it combines the processing techniques
of Information Theory with the inviolable laws of Quantum Mechanics.
2.2 Basics of Information Theory
Information Theory, the mathematical theory of communication, has two predomi-
nant intents:
 the derivation of the fundamental theoretical limits on the achievable perfor-
mance, when communicating information from a given source over a given
channel with the use of coding schemes from within a prescribed class.
 The development of coding schemes providing performance that is reasonably
good in comparison with the optimal performance given by the theory [1].
This remarkable discipline was developed by Claude Shannon at Bell Labs in
1940. With Shannon, the information is represented by signals, which in turn are
carriers of informative contents.
The aim of Shannon was to characterize and define the quantity of information
emitted by a source and to discover a way to represent the informative content by the
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signals, so that the information remains undistorted even if the transmitted signals
are corrupted by noise.
A communication system as described by Information Theory is depicted below
[2]:
Source Source Encoder Channel Encoder
Channel DecoderSource DecoderDestination
Channel
In the following, the block diagram will be exploited in order to present the basic
results of Information Theory: The Source Coding Theorem and The Channel Coding
Theorem.
2.2.1 Source and Information
The aim of describing mathematically the process under investigation gives rise to the
necessity of defining a suitable quantity as well as a unit to measure it: so Shannon
introduced the quantity of Information in a message. For a discrete source with
finite number of messages he defined the information content of the symbol x as the
logarithm of the inverse of its probability:
i(x) = log
(
1
p(x)
)
= − log(p(x)) (2.1)
The convention of using a base-two logarithm implies that the units of this mea-
sure are bits.
Another fundamental quantity is Entropy, that can be thought as a measure of
our uncertainty about which symbol will be chosen and emitted by the source: for a
source with higher entropy, this uncertainty is higher [2].
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The Entropy of the discrete random variable X is defined as:
H(X) = −
∑
x
pX(x) log2(pX(x)) (2.2)
where pX(x) is the probability mass function associated with random variable X
[3].
2.2.2 Source coding
The task of the Source encoder block is to represent (encode) the information by
signals in an proficient way; the aim is to compress data in order to use the system
more efficiently.
In source coding, the Entropy of a random variable tells us precisely about its
compressibility. If we assume a finite range X , we could use dlog |X|e bits per symbol
to encode the random variable X: nevertheless, this is not optimal if some symbols
are more frequent than others. A way to solve this problem is to encode more
frequent symbols using fewer bits and vice versa. We define the encoding rate R as
the average number of bits per symbol. With this concept in mind, we can express
one of the fundamental results of Shannon [4]:
It is not possible to compress a source with a Rate R lower than its Entropy:
H(X) ≤ R (2.3)
Theorem 1 (Source Coding Theorem).
The cardinal concept of the Source Coding Theorem is that the average num-
ber of bits needed to encode the source symbol can be made as small as Entropy,
but not smaller.
The source encoding is accomplished by giving the shorter code words to the sym-
bols with higher probabilities. One of the drawbacks of source encoding is that when
one received symbol is in error, the synchronisation between encoder and decoder
will be lost for some time, resulting in a series of erroneously decoded symbols. A lot
of efforts have been done to find the suitable code words so as that resynchronisation
is obtained as fast as possible [2].
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2.2.3 Channel coding
The task of the Channel encoder block is to represent the information by the channel
signals is such a way that no information is lost if the signals are distorted and even
if some finite error probability exists. The target is to find the most efficient way to
transmit information over a potentially noisy channel. Therefore, it’s necessary to
take into consideration the tradeoff between:
 optimizing the transmission rate
 maintaining the transmission reliability
In order to meet the first requirement, we want to transmit as many symbols as
possible per channel use, while for the second one we would like to have a vanishingly
small probability that the message arrives inconsistently at the output of the channel
[4].
The main result showed by Shannon is that the error probability can be made as
small as we wish if the information flow is smaller then the Channel Capacity, a
quantity that is characteristic of the channel.
For the additive white noise Gaussian channel, the capacity only depends on the
bandwidth and the signal-to-noise ratio. Denoting the signal power by P , the noise
power by N , and the bandwidth by B, the resulting capacity C is [2]:
C = B log2
(
1 +
P
N
)
(2.4)
In principle, a channel with Capacity C is capable, with suitable coding, of tran-
smitting at any rate less than C bits per symbol with vanishingly small probability
of error. For rates greater than C the probability of error cannot be made arbitrarily
small.
Another crucial notion of information used by Shannon was Mutual Infor-
mation. Entropy is in fact a notion of self information: the information that a
random process provides by itself. Mutual information is instead a measure of
the information contained in one process about another process. While entropy is
sufficient to study the reproduction of a single process through a noiseless environ-
ment, more often one has two or more distinct random processes, e.g., one random
process representing an information source and another representing the output of
a communication medium wherein the coded source has been corrupted by another
random process called noise. In such cases observations are made on one process in
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order to make decisions on another [1]. Therefore, Shannon introduced the notion
of Mutual Information between two processes:
I(X, Y ) = H(X) +H(Y )−H(X, Y ) (2.5)
that is, the sum of the two self entropies minus the entropy of the pair.
The quantity H(X, Y ) is called Joint Entropy and in the case of two random
variables X and Y is defined as:
H(X, Y ) = −
∑
x,y
PXY (x, y) logPXY (x, y) (2.6)
where PXY (x, y) is the probability distribution of the joint random variable XY .
The Mutual Information can also be defined in terms of Conditional Entropy
(or equivocation) H(X|Y ) = H(X, Y )−H(Y ), which characterizes the compressibi-
lity of the variable X if Y is known to both the encoder and the decoder. Hence:
I(X, Y ) = H(X)−H(X|Y ) = H(Y )−H(Y |X) (2.7)
In this form the Mutual Information can be interpreted as the information born
by one process minus the additional information it bears when the other process is
already known [1].
Finally, Shannon defined the input distribution as PX(x) and showed this funda-
mental result [4]:
The basic upper bound on the rate of transmission is I(X, Y ) bits per channel
use. This maximization defines the Channel Capacity:
C = max
PX(x)
I(X, Y ) (2.8)
Theorem 2 (Channel Coding Theorem).
2.2.4 Information Theoretic notion of secrecy
In 1949, Claude Shannon exploited the previous results in order to provide the infor-
mation theory basis for secrecy: one of the main result is that the amount of secret
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information that can be introduced into an encoded message can’t be greater than
that of the cryptographic key used to encode it. In order to analyze in depth this
idea, we have to introduce the concept of Secrecy System.
A Secrecy System is defined abstractly as a set of transformations of one space
(the set of possible messages) into a second space (the set of possible cryptograms).
Each particular transformation of the set corresponds to enciphering with a particular
key. The transformations are supposed to be reversible (non-singular), so that unique
deciphering is possible when the key is known.
Each key and therefore each transformation is assumed to have an a priori pro-
bability associated with it: the probability of choosing that key.
Similarly, each possible message is assumed to have an associated a priori proba-
bility, determined by the underlying stochastic process representative of the discrete
sequence of symbols under consideration. These probabilities for the various keys and
messages are also any attacking cryptanalyst’s a priori probabilities for the choices
in question, and represent his a priori knowledge of the situation.
A schematic diagram of a general secrecy system is shown below, where M is the
message, E is the cryptogram, K is the key [5]:
Message Source Encipherer
M E
Enemy cryptanalyst
Decipherer
Key Source
E M
K K
At the transmitting end there are two information sources: a message source
and a key source. The key source produces a particular key among those that are
possible in the system. The selected key is sent to the receiver: the choice of a
key determines a particular transformation in the set forming the system. Then a
message is selected and the particular transformation corresponding to the chosen
key is applied to the message to produce a cryptogram. So if M is the message, K
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the key, and E the enciphered message, or cryptogram, we have that E is function
of the other parameters:
E = f(M,K) = TiM (2.9)
where the second mathematical structure is introduced to emphatize the fact that
the cryptogram E is the result of the transformation Ti applied to message M ; the
index i corresponds to the particular key being used.
The cryptogram is transmitted to the receiver and may be intercepted by an
adversary; the receiver applies to the cryptogram the inverse of the chosen transfor-
mation, in order to recover the original message. So at the receiving end it must be
possible to recover M , just knowing E and K. Thus the transformations Ti in the
family must have unique inverses Ti
−1 such that Ti−1Ti = I, the identity transfor-
mation. In this manner:
M = Ti
−1E (2.10)
If the adversary intercepts the cryptogram, he can calculate from it the a po-
steriori probabilities of the various possible messages and keys which might have
produced it. This set of a posteriori probabilities constitutes the adversary’s know-
ledge of the key and message after the interception.
Perfect Secrecy
A fundamental question could be how immune is a system to cryptanalysis when the
cryptanalyst has unlimited time and power available for the analysis of cryptograms.
Does a way to guarantee the system security -no matter what- actually exist?
Let’s consider a finite number of possible messages M1...Mn and their corre-
spondent a priori probabilities P (M1)...P (Mn): this are enciphered into the possible
cryptograms E1...Em thanks to the relation 2.10. The cryptanalyst intercepts a par-
ticular E and can then calculate, in principle at least, the a posteriori probabilities
for the various messages, PE(M).
The definition of Perfect Secrecy is given by the condition that, for all E the
a posteriori probabilities are equal to the a priori probabilities independently of the
values of these. This means that the cryptanalyst obtains no additional information
by intercepting the message. The drawback is that, if this condition is not satisfied,
there will exist situations in which the adversary has certain a priori probabilities,
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and certain key and message choices may occur for which the enemy’s probabilities
do change. This in turn may affect his actions and thus Perfect Secrecy has not
been obtained [5].
In order to formalize this concept, let’s define:
 PE(M) = a posteriori probability of message M if cryptogram E is intercepted.
 P (M) = a priori probability of message M .
 PM(E) = conditional probability of cryptogram E if message M is chosen.
This is the sum of the probabilities of all keys which produce cryptogram E
from message M .
 P (E) = probability of obtaining cryptogram E from any message.
By using the Bayes’ Theorem, we have:
PE(M) =
P (M)PM(E)
P (E)
(2.11)
For Perfect Secrecy we have said that PE(M) must equal P (M) for all E and
all M . Hence:
A necessary and sufficient condition for Perfect Secrecy is that:
PM(E) = P (E) (2.12)
for all M and E. This means that PM(E) must be independent of M .
Theorem 3.
This Theorem implies that an encryption scheme achieves Perfect Secrecy if, for
any two messages Mi and Mj, any cryptogram E has the same probability of being
the encryption of Mi as being the encryption of Mj.
Another fundamental assessment is that, since for a fixed i Ti gives a one-to-one
correspondence between all the M ’s and some of the E’s, there must be as many
E’s as there are M ’s. Hence there is at least one key transforming any M into any
of these E’s, but all the keys from a fixed M to different E’s must be different, and
therefore:
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In order to obtain Perfect Secrecy, the number of different keys should be
at least as great as the number of messages.
Lemma 4.
Furthermore, Perfect Secrecy can be achieved only when the secret key is at
least as long as the plaintext message. Shannon proved this basic lemma, but he
didn’t say how to obtain such a long secret key. Anyway, this concept can be restric-
tive if we take into account that the secret key needs to be transmitted confidentially:
if we have a private line to transmit it securely, and the key is of the same length
of the message itself, it would be better to use that resource to forward directly the
confidential information. For this reason, the accepted convention is to use a smaller
secret key; this makes confidentiality achievable in practice but at the cost of a secu-
rity’s performance leak, as from Shannon’s theory the security of this scheme cannot
be perfect.
Leaving aside the problem of sending confidential information for now (we will
come back to all these aspects in Section 2.4 ), another important argument concerns
the physical carrying of information: a basic result is that a piece of information must
be stored or written on a medium and hence must follow the laws of physics. In his
theory, Shannon essentially assumes a classical physical support. When the medium
is of atomic scale, such as photons, the carried information behaves quite differently,
so it’s necessary to introduce the basic law of Quantum Mechanics involved in this
approach: this will be done in the following section [4].
2.3 Fundamentals of Quantum Mechanics
The idea of exploiting the fundamental principles of Quantum Mechanics and apply
them to the rising field of Quantum Cryptography was first proposed by Stephen
Wiesner (1983) and by Charles H. Bennett and Gilles Brassard (1984) [6].
At that time, the Information Security field was finally growing enough that
physicists were ready to consider Quantum Mechanics as a tool for new engineering.
The amazing theory governing this discipline is based on apparently negative rules
about things that cannot be done: nevertheless, these rules opened an incredibly
wide ranging area of applications and allowed a substantial increasing in the system
performance.
We introduce this set of negative rules, that will be analyzed further:
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 One cannot take a measurement without perturbing the system.
 One cannot determine simultaneously a couple of characteristics of a quantum
object with arbitrarily high accurancy.
 One cannot duplicate an unknown quantum state.
In the following, we will investigate the fundamental principles of Quantum Me-
chanics that play a role in the developing of the new Quantum Cryptography
field. But before that, the first thing that should be done when approaching the
Quantum Physics discipline, is to focus on the preeminent definitions that could
help our understanding of this challenging field of study.
2.3.1 Basic definitions
Quantum states
We can refer to a quantum state as the state of a quantum system. Substantially, a
quantum state is a linear superposition of other quantum states, which means that a
particle in one quantum state is also simultaneously in other quantum states. With
the aim of examining in depth this concept, let’s introduce a complex Hilbert space
H, which in quantum mechanics is used to describe a physical system. The state of
this physical system is in turn any unit-sized vector denoted |ψ〉. With this notation
in mind, we can describe the Hilbert space H as spanned by some orthonormal basis
{|b〉}: the state |ψ〉 can then be written as a complex linear combination of the basis
vectors [4]:
|ψ〉 =
∑
b
cb|b〉 (2.13)
with: cb ∈ C and
∑
b |cb|2 = 1. The decomposition coefficients cb can be expressed
as the inner product between |b〉 and |ψ〉, and denoted as: cb = 〈b|ψ〉. The linear
combination of equation (2.13) is then a superposition: this refers to the fact that
any given quantum state can be decomposed into a linear sum, i.e. a superposition of
eigenstates that are in a physical sense mutually incompatible, which in turn allows
them to be mathematically modeled as orthogonal basis vectors in Hilbert space [7].
Qubits
We already know that the bit is used to model the smallest classical information unit;
the physical representation of a classical bit is generally a system containing many
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atoms, and is described by one or more continuous parameters (such as voltages).
In this circumstance two well-separated regions are chosen to represent 0 and 1, and
signals are periodically restored toward these regions in order to avoid drifting caused
by perturbations or imperfect conditions [8].
The quantum counterpart of the bit is the qubit, which models the smallest quan-
tum information unit: it is typically a microscopic system, such as an atom or nuclear
spin, or polarized photon. A qubit can be defined as a quantum system that lies in
a two-dimensional Hilbert space: the basis is called the computational basis and de-
noted as {|0〉, |1〉}, in such a way that a qubit state can be described as c0|0〉+ c1|1〉
with [4]:
|c0|2 + |c1|2 = 1 (2.14)
This means that, according to quantum information theory, a qubit can be a
linear superposition of the two classical states, with complex coefficients; anyway,
from any given qubit we can extract no more than one classical bit of information,
and the more information we obtain about it, the more we disturb it irreversibly [9].
The Boolean states 0 and 1 are then represented by a fixed pair of reliably di-
stinguishable states of the qubit: as an example we use horizontal and vertical pola-
rizations:
|0〉 =↔ and |1〉 =l (2.15)
while intermediate states, or superposition, correspond to other polarizations, and
they can be depicted by:
↗=
√
1/2(|0〉+ |1〉) and ↘=
√
1/2(|0〉 − |1〉) (2.16)
The main difference with the intermediate states of a classical bit is that these
intermediate states cannot be reliably distinguished, even in principle, from the basis
states. If we take a measurement which distinguishes the states |0〉 and |1〉, the
superposition: |ψ〉 = c0|0〉 + c1|1〉 behaves like |0〉 with probability c02 and like |1〉
with probability c1
2. This means that two quantum states are reliably distinguishable
if and only if their vector representations are orthogonal :
 ↔ and l are reliably distinguishable by one type of measurement;
 ↗ and ↘ are reliably distinguishable by another type of measurement;
 there’s no way to reliably distinguish ↔ from ↗.
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The previous result is an interesting property of quantum mechanics, that will
be suitable for the subsequent dissertations [8].
Von Neumann Entropy
We have previously introduced the concept of Shannon Entropy, and we have seen
that it measures the uncertainty of a classical random variable; we would like to
generalize this notion to quantum information, and that’s why we introduce the von
Neumann Entropy, which measures some form of uncertainty in a quantum state.
In quantum mechanics, physical quantities are associated with linear operators
called observables: these are linear applications from the Hilbert space H to H
itself. We can denote as O|ψ〉 the application of an operator O to a state |ψ〉.
Subsequently, we can define the trace of an operator (for some orthonormal basis
{|b〉}) as:
Tr O =
∑
b
〈b|O|b〉 (2.17)
Another useful representation is the density matrix, which is a positive linear
operator that represents a quantum state. A classical random variable, yielding state
|ψi〉 with probability pi, gives the density matrix:
ρ =
∑
i
pi|ψi〉〈ψi| (2.18)
We can then give the definition of pure quantum state: ρ is pure whenever it
can be written as a density operator (called projector): ρ = |ψ〉〈ψ|. Otherwise, it is
called mixed [4].
 Examples of pure states: |0〉〈0|, |1〉〈1|, | ↗〉〈↗ |, | ↘〉〈↘ |
 An example of mixed state:
ρ =
1
4
(|0〉〈0|+ |1〉〈1|+ | ↗〉〈↗ |+ | ↘〉〈↘ |) (2.19)
Exploiting this tools we can finally introduce the von Neumann entropy of ρ:
H(ρ) = −Tr(ρ log ρ) (2.20)
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The von Neumann entropy admits an intuitive interpretation. Suppose that
Alice generates a random quantum state |ψx〉 according to some probability density
pX(x) of a random variable X. Suppose further that Bob has not yet received
the state from Alice and does not know which one she sent. The expected density
operator from Bob’s point of view is the ρ of formulation 2.20. We can then exploit
this result to get an interpretation on H(ρ): it quantifies Bob’s uncertainty about the
state sent by Alice, as his expected information gain is H(ρ) qubits upon receiving
and measuring the state that Alice sends [10].
To sum up, we have now all the essential elements required as foundations in
order to fully understand the main concepts and principles of Quantum Mechanics,
that will be analyzed in the following.
2.3.2 The Quantum Superposition principle
One of the main aspect that uniquely distinguishes quantum theory from any classical
theories in physics is the Quantum Superposition Principle; it is one of the
fundamental axiom of quantum mechanics and expresses the idea that a system can
exist simultaneously in two or more mutually exclusive states.
A quantum state is a linear superposition of other quantum states, which
means that a particle in one quantum state is also simultaneously in other
quantum states.
Axiom 5 (The Quantum Superposition principle).
The point is that quantum systems subsist in a superposition of mutually in-
compatible states, because they are expressions of entities that intrinsically ’lack’
something until a measurement transforms them into an actual system [7].
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2.3.3 The Observer Effect principle
This principle refers to all the modifications that the act of observation can make on
an observed event.
Observing a phenomenon -or measuring it- will perturb the system.
Axiom 6 (The Observer Effect principle).
If we adress the eavesdropper with the name Eve, in order to indentify a malicious
entity with the role of the adversary in cryptology, we can exploit this apparently
negative law to our advantage. In fact, thanks to the Observer Effect princi-
ple, Eve cannot get any information about the communication without introducing
perturbations that would in principle reveal her presence.
Let’s presume that Alice (the traditional sender side of the communication) co-
des information in individual photons, with the aim of sending them to Bob (the
conventional receiver). If Bob receives the photons unperturbed, then, according to
the Observer Effect’s axiom, the photons were not measured; this implies that Eve
did not get any information about the photons (acquiring information is synonymous
with carrying out measurements).
After the photons-exchange, Alice and Bob check for the presence of Eve to
establish if she was listenting: they just have to compare a randomly chosen subset
of their data using a pubblic channel. If the received subset of Bob turns out to be
unperturbed, then we establish that the adversary didn’t get information, since the
absence of perturbation implies no measurement, thus no eavesdropping.
2.3.4 The Heisenberg Uncertainty principle
The precision with which pairs of physical properties of a particle can be known
simultaneously, has a fundamental limit which is depicted by the Heisenberg Un-
certainty principle.
In fact, we can realize two different measures over a quantum system if and only
if the two observables A and B (see Section 2.3 ) commute, that is: AB = BA. If
they don’t, then a simultaneous measurement implies uncertainty on both results.
In order to quantify these equivocalities, we can consider the variances on both
measures:
σm
2 = 〈A2〉 − (〈A〉)2 (2.21)
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and
σn
2 = 〈B2〉 − (〈B〉)2 (2.22)
where 〈X〉 and 〈X2〉 are the mean value and the root mean square value of the
measure, respectively.
These formulations give rise to an important result, known as the Heisenberg
Uncertainty principle. It can be shown that [11]:
The simultaneous measurement over two non-commutative observable im-
plies equivocality on both results. The variances follow this inequality:
σmσn ≥ 1
2
|〈ψ|[A− 〈A〉,B− 〈B〉]|ψ〉| (2.23)
Axiom 7 (The Uncertainty principle).
2.3.5 The No-cloning theorem
Suppose we have a quantum state |s〉 of a particular system which we would like
to copy. This is the case of a malicious adversary whose primary intent is to get
information about the communication without being detected, for example by ma-
king a copy of the message and sending the other one to the authorized receiver.
But is it effectively possible? The answer was given in 1982 by Wootters and Zurek:
quantum-mechanical states cannot be cloned.
It is impossible to make a perfect copy of an unknown quantum state.
Theorem 8 (The No-cloning theorem).
This impossibility of cloning may seem at first an annoying restriction, but, if
used with consciousness, it turns out to be a useful advantage, since we can exploit
this property against the eavesdropper [12]. Eve could try to create a perfect copy of
the quantum state sent by Alice with the aim of keeping the copy for herself and let
the original move onward unperturbated; thanks to this principle, Eve cannot create
a perfect copy of the state, thus she will face some gap of information.
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2.4 Cryptographic Security Mechanisms
The term Cryptography is used to specify the techniques designed to ensure the
confidentiality of information during the transmission, but it encompasses other fun-
damental functions such as authentication, signature and secret sharing. In this
chapter, we will deal with encryption, unconditionally secure authentication and key
agreement ; all these topics will be analyzed in details.
2.4.1 Encryption
The aim of encryption is to ensure the confidentiality of the transmission, by
rendering a message unintelligible to any unauthorized entity; this target can be
achieved by using an algorithm (also called a cryptosystem or cipher) to combine a
message with some additional information-known as the encryption key- and produce
a cryptogram. In order for the cryptosystem to be secure in the sense of Section
2.2.4, it should be impossible to unlock the cryptogram without the key; anyway in
practice, this requirement is mitigated so that the system is just extremely difficult
to crack: the main goal is to protect the message at least as long as the informative
content is valuable [6]. Essentially, there are two basic types of encryption schemes,
depending on whether Alice and Bob use the same key:
 Asymmetrical (public-key) cryptosystems
 Symmetrical (secret-key) cryptosystems
Asymmetrical (public-key) cryptosystems
In an Asymmetrical (public-key) cryptosystem, different keys are used for encryption
and decryption. This class of cryptosystems was first proposed in 1976 by Whitfield
Diffie and Martin Hellman, while the first actual implementation was then developed
by Ronald Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adleman in 1978: it is known as RSA
and is still widely used. The main principle is that, in order for Bob to be able to
receive messages encrypted with a public-key cryptosystem, he must first choose a
private key, and keeps it secret; after that, he computes a public key from this private
key, and discloses it to any interested entity. Alice can then use this public key to
encrypt her message: She transmits the encrypted message to Bob, who decrypts it
with the private key.
The foundation of the security of public-key cryptosystems is the computational
complexity : the idea is to use mathematical objects called one-way functions. This
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means that it is easy to compute the function f(x) given the variable x, but difficult
to reverse the calculation and deduce x from f(x), where with ”difficult” we mean
that the time required to perform a task grows superpolynomially with the number
of bits in the input, while ”easy” stands for a performing time growing polynomially
[6].
Strengths and Weaknesses of Asymmetrical cryptosystems
1. The first advantage of the Asymmetrical technique is that no key agreement
is required in advance, since the only key that needs to be shared with the
other entity is a public key that can be safely shared with everyone.
2. The second benefit is that the asymmetrical algorithm requires that only the
member that has generated the key has the task to successfully keep it secret,
while, as we will see in the next section, the security of a symmetric algorithm
depends on two parties.
3. The third strength is that the issue of trusting the other party disappears in
many scenarios, since without knowledge of your secret key, that entity cannot
do malicious actions, such as digitally sign a document with your private key
or divulge your secret key to others.
Nevertheless, the Asymmetrical technique has also some disadvantages, such
as [13]:
1. all public-key cryptosystems rely for their security on unproven assumptions,
which could themselves be weakened or suppressed by theoretical or practical
advances. This increases the risks related to that technique.
2. An Asymmetric algorithm tends to be slower than a symmetric one.
3. They provide lower security than symmetric algorithms for a given key size.
Symmetrical (secret-key) cryptosystems
Symmetrical cryptosystems require the use of a single key for both encryption and
decryption. Thanks to section 2.2.4 we are already familiar with perfect secrecy, and
now we recall these concepts in order to introduce Perfectly secret ciphers, for which
the knowledge of the ciphertext (encrypted data) does not change the statistical
distribution of the plaintext messages (original data).
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The most important and famous example of perfectly secret cipher is the One-
time pad: in this scheme, Alice encrypts her message, a string of bits denoted by
the binary number m1, using a randomly generated key k, which in turn consists of
a string of bits of length at least equal to the length of the plaintext message. Then,
she simply adds modulo 2 each bit of the message to the corresponding bit of the
key to obtain the scrambled text s:
s = m1  k (2.24)
The scrambled text is then sent to Bob, who decrypts the message by subtracting
the key:
s k = m1  k  k = m1 (2.25)
The bits of the scrambled text do not contain any information, as they are as
random as those of the key. This means that this cryptosystem is provably secure
according to Information theory; actually, this is the only provably perfectly secure
cryptosystem known today. Although perfectly secure, this scheme has a huge pro-
blem: Alice and Bob need to possess a common secret key, which must be at least
as long as the message itself, and that key can only be used for a single encryption
(hence the name ”One-time pad”). If they used the key more than once, Eve could
record all of the scrambled messages and start to build up a picture of the plain
texts and thus also of the key; furthermore, the key has to be transmitted with some
trusted methods. Because of all these problems, the One-time pad is used only for
critical applications [6].
Strengths and Weaknesses of Symmetrical cryptosystems
1. This type of encryption is simple and does not require a lot of computer re-
sources.
2. Since a different secret key is used for communication with every different
entity, if a key is compromised only the messages between a particular pair of
sender and receiver are affected. The other communications are still secure.
3. Symmetric algorithms are much faster than asymmetric algorithms, especially
for bulk data encryption.
4. Symmetric algorithms provide a higher level of security than asymmetric algo-
rithms for a given key size.
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For what concerns the limitations of this techniques, we have to keep in mind
that:
1. Symmetric cryptography needs a secure channel for secret key exchange, in
order to share a secret key before any secure communication can be initiated,
and both parties must then ensure that the key remains secret.
2. In a large network using symmetric encryption there will be many key pairs, all
of which must be securely managed. Because the secret key is exchanged and
stored in more than one place, the symmetric key must be changed frequently
[13].
We have pointed out advantages and disadvantages of both techniques, and for
this reason it is important to notice that one type of cryptography does not re-
place the other: they should be used appropriately and in a complementary manner,
exploiting the distinctive benefits depending on the situation.
2.4.2 Authentication
Authentication is a set of techniques with the aim of verifying that a transmitted
message arrives unmodified at the receiver: this implies that if the message has been
modified of created by another entity which is not the sender, it can be detected and
discarded [14]. The main attacks against an authentication scheme are the following:
 Impersonation: after seeing n messages m1....mn, the malicious opponent crea-
tes a message m′n+1 that he wants to be accepted by the receiver as legitimate.
 Substitution: after seeing n messages m1....mn, the malicious opponent modifies
the message mn and replace it with his own message m
′
n that he wants to be
accepted by the receiver as legitimate [4].
So the main issue that authentication wants to solve is: how can Bob be sure
that the message he has received was actually sent by Alice? In addition, how can
he be sure that the message was not corrupted by Eve during the transmission?
As for encryption, authentication schemes are classified as being Computatio-
nally secure or Unconditionally secure. Computationally secure means that the
security of the scheme relies on the computational difficulty to crack it; while Un-
conditionally secure denote a scheme whose security is indipendent of the computing
power or time applied by an opponent attempting to encroach the system.
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In general, the authentication depends on the message content: as an example,
authentication is achieved by adding some form of redundancy -called Message Au-
thentication Code (MAC)- to the original message. The secret key K shared by Alice
and Bob is used to generate and verify the MAC: before sending the message, Alice
attaches a MAC, calculated as a function of the key and the message itself. When
Bob receives the message, he calculates his MAC and compares it with the attached
MAC. If they match (and provided that the shared key is not compromised), Bob
can be confident that the message is legitimate [4].
A good example of a computationally secure authentication scheme is a MAC
built upon block ciphers, while a model of unconditionally secure MAC is the one
calculated from universal families of hash functions.
Computationally secure MAC: built upon block cipher
Let m be the message to be authenticated, composed of β blocks (denoted with mi),
each of length b. Let FK be a block cipher with key K: that is, a cryptographic
primitive which encrypts a block of b bits at a time using a key of n bits. We start
by encrypting the first block:
a1 = FK(m1) (2.26)
After that, the second block is bitwise modulo-2 added to a1 before it is encrypted.
That is:
a2 = FK(m2  a1) (2.27)
For each of the next blocks, one computes:
ai = FK(mi  ai−1) (2.28)
Finally, the value of the last encryption aβ is used as a MAC.
The security of this scheme depends on the strength of the underlying block
cipher, in the sense that if the block cipher is secure, this construction gives a strong
MAC. Anyway, in the scope of Quantum Cryptography, the idea is to step away from
computational assumption, and that’s why we need to define unconditionally secure
MACs.
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Unconditionally secure MAC: built upon universal families of hash func-
tion
A well-studied technique for designing Unconditionally secure MACs is based on
strongly universal families of hash functions, as proposed by Wegman and Carter
[Universal classes of hash functions]. The basic idea behind universal hash-function
families based MACs is to compress the message to be authenticated (using a univer-
sal hash function) and then encrypt the compressed image (e.g., using one-time pad
ciphers, stream ciphers, or pseudorandom functions). In order to fully understand
these concepts, is useful to introduce the core principle of this technique:
Universal families of hash function In general, a hash function is a function
that maps a larger set to a smaller one, with the property that any two different inputs
are likely to yield different outputs. In our technique we will use a family of hash
function: the choice of the specific hash function that will be employed is kept secret
by the legitimate parties. The security of this construction comes from the properties
of the family itself, rather than from those of the individual hash functions, which
can be very simple: that’s why we’re going to introduce a fundamental property for
families, the Strong Universality [4].
Given two sets A and B, a class H of functions A → B is |B|-almost strongly
2-universal if the following two conditions are satisfied:
 for any x1 ∈ A and any y1 ∈ B,we have:
|{h ∈ H : h(x1) = y1}| ≤ |H||B| (2.29)
 for any x1 6= x2 ∈ A and any y1, y2 ∈ B, we have:
|{h ∈ H : h(x1) = y1 ∧ h(x2) = y2}| ≤ |H||B|2 (2.30)
If the last condition in satisfied for  = 1, the class is simply called strongly
2-universal
Definition 9 ( |B| -almost strongly 2-universal).
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Where if S is a set, |S| will denote its size, that is, the number of elements in S.
To sum up, the idea of a universal class of hash functions is to define a collection
H of hash functions in such a way that a random choice of a function h ∈ H yields a
low probability that any two distinct inputs x and y will collide when their hashed
values are computed using the function h [15]. Then, given a |B| -almost strongly
2-universal family, we can compute the MAC as:
MAC = hK(m) (2.31)
where m is the message to authenticate and K the shared secret key.
Regarding the main attacks against an authentication scheme we’ve disclosed
before, the use of an |B| -almost strongly 2-universal family of hash functions allows
the MAC to have:
 Impersonation probability = 1|B|
 Substitution probability ≤ |B|
No matter how powerful the opponent’s computer is and no matter how crypta-
nalysis evolves over the year: Eve won’t misleave the legitimate parties, except with
an arbitrarily small probability.
2.4.3 Key Agreement
Key Agreement is the problem of generating a shared secret key K by two entities
knowing dependent random variables X and Y , respectively. So Key Agreement
solves the following problem: two entities i and j wish to agree on keying information
in secret over a distributed network; each party desires an assurance that no party
other than i and j can possibly compute the keying information agreed.
In general, the main desirable attributes for a key agreement protocols are the
subsequents [16]:
1. Resilience against known past keys : the protocol still achieves its goal even if
the opponent has learned some previous keys.
2. Forward secrecy : if long-term secrets of one or more entities are compromised,
the secrecy of previous session keys is not affected.
3. Loss of information: Compromise of other information that would not ordina-
rily be available to an adversary does not affect the security of the protocol.
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4. Message indipendence: If the protocol runs between two honest entities, indi-
vidual flows are unrelated.
In the following, we will deal with specific method of exchanging cryptographic
keys: the Diffie Hellman key agreement, which is one of the earliest practical
examples of key exchange implemented within the field of cryptography and is Com-
putationally secure, and the Information Theoretic key agreement, which on
the contrary is guaranteed to be Unconditionally secure.
Diffie Hellman Key Agreement
Diffie-Hellman key agreement provided the first practical solution to the key sha-
ring problem, allowing two parties, never having met in advance or sharing keying
material, to establish a shared secret by exchanging messages over an open channel.
The security rests on the intractability of the Diffie-Hellman problem and the related
problem of computing discrete logarithms. We will analyze the protocol step by step:
 The first thing is to select and publish an appropriate prime p and a number
α, called the generator of the multiplicative group of integers modulo p (where
an element α is called a generator of a group A if every element in A can be
expressed as the product of finitely many powers of α);
 After that, Alice picks a random number x and evaluates:
αx mod p (2.32)
and sends it to Bob through the public channel.
 Bob chooses another random number y, then computes and sends to Alice the
value:
αy mod p (2.33)
 Bob receives αx and computes the shared key as:
(αx)y mod p (2.34)
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 Alice receives αy and computes the shared key as:
(αy)x mod p (2.35)
we see that the resulting secret key are the same, since:
(αy)x mod p = (αx)y mod p = k (2.36)
 If Eve wants to compute k, then she would need either x or y. Otherwise,
Eve would need to solve a Discrete Logarithm Problem, and there is no known
algorithm able to accomplish this with a polynomial complexity in the number
of digits of p.
Information Theoretic Key Agreement
In 1993, Maurer introduced a general Information theoretic model for key agreement
[17]. It takes place in a scenario where Alice and Bob are connected by an insecure
channel to which a passive eavesdropper Eve has perfect access; Alice and Bob, who
want to establish a mutual secret key have access to realizations of random variables
X and Y , respectively, whereas the adversary Eve knows a random variable Z: these
variables are distributed according to some joint probability distribution PXY Z . The
context is the following one [18,19]:
Alice Bob 
Eve 
P 
XYZ 
X Y 
Z 
Figure 2.1: Secret key agreement by public discussion from common information
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A surprising fact that was demonstrated by Maurer was that, even if Eve’s channel
is much superior compared to that of Alice and Bob, unconditionally secure secret
key agreement is possible, provided Alice and Bob know PXY Z . In the following,
we will consider the case of a source that sends out random bits at very low signal
power and Alice, Bob and Eve receive these bits over indipendent binary-symmetric
channels with error probabilities α, β and  respectively. A key agreement protocol
for such a scenario generally consists of three phases:
1. Advantage distillation
2. Information reconciliation
3. Privacy ampification
Alice’s string 
Bob’s information Eve’s information 
Advantage distillation 
Information reconciliation 
Privacy amplification 
Figure 2.2: Phases of a Secret-Key-Agreement Protocol
Advantage distillation: this phase is needed when neither Alice nor Bob has
an advantage compared to Eve with respect to the information about each other’s
random variables. The objective of this phase is hence to generate an advantage over
the opponent by exploiting the authenticity of the public channel. After this phase,
involving a sequence of messages summarized in a random variable C, Alice can
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compute a string W from X and C about which Bob has less uncertainty than Eve:
H(W |Y C) < H(W |ZC). Essentially, the basic idea of the advantage distillation
phase is that Alice and Bob use the noiseless discussion channel for exchanging
information about their bits in an insicure but authentic way, with the objective of
identifying bits that are correct with a higher probability than others.
Information reconciliation: this second phase consists of interactive error cor-
rection; after advantage distillation Bob has more information about Alice’s string
than Eve, and after information reconciliation, Bob should exactly know Alice’s
string. This means that Alice and Bob exchange redundant information and apply
error-correction techniques in order for Bob to be able to learn W with very high
probability but such that Eve is left only with incomplete information about it.
Privacy ampification: in this last step, Alice and Bob distill from W a shorter
string K about which Eve has only a negligible amount of information. For istance,
Alice and Bob publicly agree on a function g that becomes known to Eve, and they let
K = g(W ). This is related with the concept of hash function introduced in Section
2.4.3, and will be analyzed in details in Chapter 3 in the Privacy Amplification
section [18,19].
Eve’s information 
Figure 2.3: Eliminating Eve’s knowledge by Privacy Amplification
3 | Quantum Key Distribution
In the previous chapter we have briefly reviewed the foundations of Quantum In-
formation Theory, with the aim to present the main laws and principles that can
be used to ensure the confidentiality of information, by exploiting the fascinating
behaviour of photons; now we are ready to introduce the security mechanism that is
dealt with in this dissertation: Quantum Key Distribution (QKD).
QKD uses the main principles of quantum mechanics in order to guarantee a
secure communication between two parties, conventionally called Alice and Bob. To
ensure the confidentiality of communications, they agree on a common yet secret
key, that is, a piece of information with whom they can perform an encryption of the
message, so that the result is incomprehensible to an observer who doesn’t know the
key. Alice anb Bob wish to exchange a key having access to a Quantum Communi-
cation Channel, on which quantum carriers -i.e. photons- are transmitted, and to a
Public Classical Authenticated Channel, on which the two parties will exchange side
information in order to detect the presence of an eavesdropper Eve. In the following,
we will refer to the scheme depicted in Figure 3.1 :
Quantum Channel 
Classical Channel 
ALICE EVE BOB 
Figure 3.1: QKD model
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Alice encodes random pieces of information -i.e. random bits- in the quantum
carriers, in order to build the key; she then sends them to Bob through the quantum
channel. Eve might eavesdrop this transmission and therefore spy on potential secret
key bits; anyway, this does not pose a fundamental problem, since the eavesdropping
is detectable thanks to the arise of transmission errors. Furthermore, as we can
deduce from the presence of a Public Classical Authenticated Channel, Quantum
Key Distribution is not only based on the main principles of quantum mechanics,
but it also relies on Classical Information Theory : in order to obtain a distributed
key which is common and secret, the transmission errors detected previously must
be corrected, and after that, is fundamental to ensure that Eve knows nothing about
the key. These two targets are achieved by exploiting techniques from classical
information theory, denoted as secret-key distillation techniques.
One of the remarkable aspect of Quantum Key Distribution is that Shannon’s
condition on the secret key length needed to achieve perfect secrecy is no longer a
problem, since we can use QKD to obtain a long secret key, and then use it classically
to encrypt a message of the same length. Furthermore, the security of QKD is
guaranteed by the laws of quantum mechanics, enabling the long-term secrecy of
confidential data transmission [4].
Quantum Key Distribution is such a prosperous field that it gave rise to several
different approaches, that can be divided into two main categories, depending on the
property they exploit:
 Entanglement based protocols : these protocols are based on entanglement,
which is a quantum phenomenon that implies that a measurement performed
on one physical system affects the other, even if they are spatially separated.
This means that the quantum states of two or more distinct objects are cor-
related, and they can be described as a combined quantum state rather than
as individual entities. This principle can be exploited in the subsequent way:
if Alice and Bob share an entangled pair of objects, the overall system will
be altered if an eavesdropper intercepts either object, and this will reveal the
presence of Eve.
 Prepare and measure protocols : we already know from the Observer Effect prin-
ciple (Section 2.3.3 ), that measuring an unknown quantum state will change
that state in some way. We can exploit this peculiarity with the aim of detec-
ting an eavesdropper and calculating the amount of information intercepted.
In the following, we will deal with the QKD schemes of Prepare and measure
category.
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With the purpose of efficiently introducing this disquisition, we will introduce
the subsequent concepts by simultaneously proposing an overview of the first QKD
protocol, created in 1984 by Bennett and Brassard and called BB84. This protocol
is an exquisite model that can be exploited in order to focus on the main aspects of
the QKD technique and understand it as broadly as possible.
3.1 Key Exchange
The main purpose of QKD is to distribute a secret key between Alice and Bob,
who share no information initially, and protect it from an adversary called Eve, who
eavesdrops on their communications. We have broadly enlightened that the funda-
mental component of this process is the qubit, an elementary quantum system -i.e.
a photon- used to encode digital information, and that, following the Uncertainty
principle (see Section 2.3.4 ), there exist pairs of properties such that measuring one
property necessarily randomizes the value of the other. An example of this phenome-
non is measuring a single photon’s linear polarization: this, for example, randomizes
its circular polarization, and vice versa; in general, any pair of polarization states
will be referred to as a basis if they corrispond to a reliably measurable property of
a single photon [20].
But what are the main tools in order to deal with polarization? We know from
[21] that we can produce polarized light by sending an ordinary light beam through
a polarizing apparatus -such as a Polaroid filter or calcite crystal-; the beam’s polari-
zation axis will be determined by the orientation of the polarizing apparatus in which
the beam originates. This allows Alice to choose a random bit string and a random
sequence of polarization bases; each base is made by two orthogonal quantum states
that are reliably distinguishable (see Section 2.3.1 ), as for example:
 the rectilinear base, depicted as ﬀ:
– ↔ represents random bit 0
– l represents random bit 1
 the diagonal base, depicted as 5:
– ↗ represents random bit 0
– ↘ represents random bit 1
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Alice selects a base for each random bit, represents this bit in the chosen base,
and sends Bob a train of photons. For each received photon, Bob decides randomly
whether to measure the photon’s rectilinear polarization or its diagonal polarization,
and interprets the result of the measurement as a binary 0 or 1. This process goes
as follows:
Figure 3.2: Key Exchange scheme [22]
At the end of this procedure, the raw bit list of Alice corresponds to the list of
bit values she has sent through the quantum channel, while the raw bit list of Bob is
composed of the list of bit values he has measured. These two lists can be different, as
qubits do not always reach the receiver due to loss in the quantum channel. In order
to extract a raw key from these raw bit lists, Bob announces to Alice -by using
classical communication- the index of the qubits for which he had a detection, so
Alice can make the related selection in her list. After that, they both have generated
a raw key.
3.2 Key Distillation
Key Distillation is the technique used to convert some random information, shared
among the legitimate parties and a potential adversary Eve, into a secret key. The
protocol is made of three steps:
1. Sifting
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2. Reconciliation
3. Privacy Amplification
We have closed the previous section with the creation of a raw key ; in the following
we will fully analyze how to exploit this result in order to obtain a secret key shared
by Alice and Bob, and unknown to Eve. The following figure schematically shows
the result of each procedure:
Alice Bob 
Quantum channel 
   Public channel 
   Qubit  
transmission 
   Key 
exchange 
   Reconciliation 
   Sifting 
   Privacy 
Amplification 
   Raw key 
   Sifted key 
   Error corrected key 
   Secret    Secret 
Figure 3.3: The Quantum Key Distribution scheme
3.2.1 Sifting
After raw key exchange, the key is sifted, that is, Bob reveals over the classical
channel some information on the sequence of detections he gets: he reports bases of
received bits, without disclosing the actual results of his measurements, while Alice
says which bases were correct. During this phase the bits that do not have a perfect
correlation between the bits of the emitter and those of the receiver are discarded.
The effect of Sifting is that sender and receiver share a correlated key, called sifted
key, with the same length; furthermore, what is revealed during the sifting does not
3.2. Key Distillation 38
allow an eavesdropper to get any information on the key. Recalling Figure 3.2, we
can enlight the results of sifting:
Figure 3.4: Sifting scheme [22]
Effect of eavesdropping
Thanks to the random mix of rectilinear and diagonal photons in the quantum tran-
smission, it is possible to detect the presence of a malicious entity: an eavesdropper
intercepting the photons will carry the risk of use the wrong basis, thus modifying
the state of these photons and producing disagreement between Bob and Alice on
some of the bits on which they expected to agree. As a consequence, Alice and Bob
simply have to check the presence of errors in the sequence of shared bits, by compa-
ring over the classical channel a sample of the bits, to verify the integrity of the key;
this of course will sacrifice the secrecy of the disclosed bits, that will be discarded,
as they may have been intercepted by Eve.
The following step is to remove errors and information that the adversary could
have collected, by processing the sifted key. This can be done by means of Reconci-
liation and Privacy Amplification processes: the resulting key is secure and can be
used as a secret key material [21].
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3.2.2 Reconciliation
Reconciliation is a type of error correction carried out between Alice and Bob’s
key, with the aim of ensure both keys are identical; this procedure is done over
the Public Classical Authenticated Channel, thus it is important to minimize the
disclosed information, as this can be monitored by the eavesdropper. In the case
of BB84, Reconciliation takes the form of an interactive error correction protocol,
that is, Alice and Bob exchange information both ways: they alternatively disclose
parities of subsets of their key elements. If they detect a diverging parity, it means
that there is at least one error in the corresponding subset: by dividing the block
and by means of a check for each sub-block, they can locate the error and correct
it. The two parties repeat the process a sufficient number of times and the result is
that they both share equal bits.
BBBSS: The first binary interactive error correction protocol used for QKD is
called BBBSS and was designed by Bennett, Brassard et al. 1991; this can be used
to find and correct errors introduced into the quantum channel from noise and from
eavesdroppers. Alice and Bob need to exchange parities of subsets of their bits:
by detecting the presence of diverging paritites, the transmitter and receiver can
focus on errors and correct them by mean of a bisection. This protocol uses several
iterations, between which the bit positions are permuted in a pseudo-random way
[4]. A schematic overview of the main criteria of BBBSS is given in the following:
1. In each iteration, Alice and Bob divide the shared binary string into sub-
blocks with the same length. That is:
l = nw (3.1)
with l = length of the overall string, n = number of subblocks and w = number
of bits for each subblock.
2. First iteration: in this first phase, the subblocks are the sets of indices:
B
(i)
j = {(j − 1)w + 1.......jw} for 1 ≤ j ≤ n (3.2)
3. Subsequent iterations: the two parties agree on a randomly-chosen per-
mutation pi(i). The purpose of the permutation is to attempt to spread out
the error bits randomly and separate consecutive errors from each other. The
subblocks contain the indices:
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B
(i)
j = {pit(i) : (j − 1)w + 1 ≤ t ≤ jw} (3.3)
4. Alice and Bob then share the parities of these subblocks by using the classical
channel to compare them; for iteration i, they disclose the parities:
P(i)X,j =
∑
t∈B(i)j
Xt (3.4)
and:
P(i)Y,j =
∑
t∈B(i)j
Yt (3.5)
with X and Y = `-bit strings of Alice and Bob respectively.
5. When a subblock has mismatching parities, it means that there is an odd num-
ber of error in that subblock, since an even number of errors would mask each
other; that is, at least one. If this is the case, a bisection is used: Alice and
Bob exchange the parity of half of the subblock, and they check if the parity
is right or wrong.
 if wrong: the two parties have to go on with the bisection in that half;
 if right: this means that at least one error exists in the other half of the
subblock; thus the bisection takes place in the other half.
The bisection ends when an erroneous bit is disclosed; Bob knows the position
of this bit and can correct it by simply flip it. For what concern secrecy, it is
assumed that the parity bits give information to the eavesdropper about the
secret key, since the exchange of parity bits occurs on the classical channel that
can be monitored by Eve. In order to prevent and circumscribe the information
gained by the adversary during this procedure, the last bit of each block and
subblock involved in the parity check is discarded [23].
The Cascade Protocol : Another common protocol used for information recon-
ciliation is the Cascade Protocol, proposed in 1994; this is an improvement of
BBBSS in terms of bits leaked during the reconciliation stages and it will be discus-
sed in the following.
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1. First iteration: is identical to the first iteration of BBBSS.
2. Second iteration: starting from the second iteration, and unlike BBBSS,
Cascade keeps track of all investigated subblocks, by taking advantage of this
information. The protocol keeps two sets of subblocks, and each subblock for
which a parity was disclosed is listed in one of these:
 B0: subblocks for which the parity is equal between Alice and Bob;
 B1: subblocks for which the parity is diverging.
3. When the bisection ends and an error is corrected -i.e. the concerned bit b is
flipped- Alice and Bob go through the list of all the subblocks for which they
have already calculated the parity in the current and previous interations. For
a subblock containing the flipped bit b, the parity is flipped as a consequence,
due to the correction of that bit. This means that there may be subblocks for
which the parity was equal between the two parties, and which is now different.
Let Si ⊆ Bi, with i = 0, 1, be the set of subblocks in Bi such that they contain
the bit b; the sets B0 and B1 are updated by considering the complement in
the following way:
B0 ← B0\S0 ∪ S1 = {x ∈ B0|x /∈ S0 ∪ S1} (3.6)
and:
B1 ← B1\S1 ∪ S0 = {x ∈ B1|x /∈ S1 ∪ S0} (3.7)
4. Before the end of an iteration, Alice and Bob correct all the known diverging
parities; among all the subblocks in B1, they proceed with a bisection in the
smallest of such subblocks, and when they find an error to correct they update
again the parities of all the previous subblocks, update B0 and B1, repeating
the process until B1 = , that is until no subblocks presents a diverging parity
[4].
3.2.3 Privacy Amplification
Privacy Amplification is a fundamental tool implemented in order to extinguish Eve’s
information at the cost of a reduced key length. The aim is to exploit what the
eavesdropper does not know about the key: so, if r is the string after reconciliation,
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n is its length, and s is an arbitrary security parameter, we can deduce, thanks to
[24], that if Eve’s knowledge about r is ≤ l deterministic bits, then a hash function
h randomly and publicly chosen from an appropriate class of functions:
{0, 1}n → {0, 1}n−l−s (3.8)
will map r into a value h(r) about which Eve’s expected information -IEve- is
upper bounded by:
IEve ≤ 2
−s
ln2
bit (3.9)
this means that by choosing a suitable arbitrary security parameter s, Eve knows
nothing at all about the final secret key h(r) shared between Alice and Bob except
with probability at most 2
−s
ln2
, in which case she knows at least one deterministic bit
[20].
The concept of Universal families of hash function was fully introduced in Section
2.4.2; in the following we will deal with some requirements for these families in the
scope of privacy amplification:
 the family should be Universal: this is because the proximity to universa-
lity directly affects the quality in terms of secrecy of the resulting key.
 The number of bits used to represent a particular hash function
within its family should be resonably low: in fact, the choice of the
specific hash function has to be transmitted between Alice and Bob, so it is
important to subdue that transmission as much as possible.
 The evaluation of a hash function within the family should be effi-
cient: in a real-time application of QKD, the secret key distillation should not
take too much time, and since the evaluation of the hash function is one of the
critical issues, this has to be handle with care.
Thanks to the processes described in the previous sections, the Key Distribution
problem is solved by allowing the exchange of a cryptographic key between two remote
parties with absolute security. In the following, we introduce the main concepts of
another QKD protocol, i.e. the B92 protocol, as it was used in the experiment at
the basis of this thesis.
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The B92 Protocol In 1992, a simplified version of the BB84 protocol was proposed
by Bennett in his paper: “Quantum cryptography using any two non-orthogonal
states” [25]. The main difference between the BB84 and the B92 protocol is that
only two states are necessary in the latter, rather than the possible four polarization
states of the former. The protocol exploits the following polarization directions: 0
can be encoded as 0 degrees in the rectilinear basis and 1 can be encoded by 45
degrees in the diagonal basis. This situation is depicted in Figure 3.5 :
Binary 0 
0° 
Binary 1 
45° 
PHOTON POLARIZATION 
Figure 3.5: B92 2-state encoding
In the B92 protocol we deal with two distinct nonorthogonal states : |u0〉 and
|u1〉. Alice prepares and transmits to Bob a sequence of photons, using states |u0〉 and
|u1〉 to represent the bits 0 and 1 respectively; Bob still randomly chooses a basis for
the measurement but if he chooses the wrong basis, he will not measure anything.
After that, Bob publicly tell Alice in which case his measurement had a positive
result, without unveil which measurement he made; in this way the two parties are
able to agree on the discarding of all the other instances. The main difference between
BB84 and B92 protocols is that, even if the former exhibits better performance in
the distribution of the secure communication key over long distance, B92 is easier
and can be implemented with less resources [26].
USD attack Although the two non-orthogonal photon-polarization states of the
B92 protocol cannot in general be distinguished unambiguously by an eavesdropping
probe without being disturbed, they can be unambiguously discriminated at least
some of the time. Thus a possible eavesdropping strategy against this protocol is the
unambiguous state discrimination attack (USD attack): it allows Eve to identify a
fraction of the signals without error. Unambiguous state discrimination is possible
whenever the N states in question are linearly independent (for our case N = 2).
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More generally, the problem can be described by a measurement which can give
the results state 0, state 1, .. state N − 1, and the result don’t know. Eve can
perform an unambiguous state discrimination (USD) measurement on the signal
states, thereby distinguishing between cases where she got a deterministic result or a
random one. After that, she applies the following strategy: in those cases where she
knows the state with certainty, she forwards it to Bob; in all other cases, she sends
no signal at all, mimicking a lossy channel. B92 protocol can therefore be affected by
such an attack: furthermore, under a given threshold no secure key transmission is
possible. This threshold, which depends on the state non-orthogonality, is defined as
the transmissivity where the probability of success of an USD measurement equals
Bob’s detection probability on the lossy channel [27, 28].
In the Canary Islands experiment we used the B92 protocol; in the hypothesis of
infinite length the asymptotic bound on the secret key rate will be:
Rk = Rraw[Aη(1− 2h())] (3.10)
wherr Rraw is the raw key rate, A is the channel attenuation, related to the
concept of turbulence, η is the protocol efficiency, h stands for the binary entropy
and  represents the QBER value. When  is greater than the 11%, then the secret key
rate drops to zero. Our exploiting-turbulence proposal selects only the transmissions
with low QBER; the aim is to guarantee that the QBER decreasing overcomes the
sifted bits loss, in order to obtain an overall enhancement of the secret key rate.
3.2.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have analyzed the main aspects of Quantum Key Distribution,
highlighting the fundamental techniques of the process, in order to understand how
the creation of a secret key is possible exploiting the laws of quantum physics. At
this point we have all the theoretical basis to introduce the innovative approach
developed in the Canary Island Experiment.
4 | The Canary Island Experiment:
an innovative approach
4.1 Motivation and application scenarios
In the previous chapters we have seen how the domain of Quantum Communica-
tions could be useful and prosperous: we have studied its basic principles, evalua-
ted the fundamental implementative features, and underlined that the introduction
of a Quantum approach enables us to develop high-performance application fields
that have been unexplored until recently. Effectively, the technological evolution is
strongly encouraging to allow more robust communications, even when remarkable
distances are introduced between the devices involved. The growing interest for the
free-space propagation and the evaluation of new methods allowing long space tran-
smissions have incentivized the need to apply Quantum Communication to great
challenges related to the connection between remote devices: the aim is to explore
new satellite employments and to accomplish ambitious scientific projects by pressing
the application of Quantum Communications toward unexplored horizons.
The main obstacle related to free-space propagation is the presence of Atmo-
spherical turbulence, which in fact introduces thermal fluctuations - thence re-
flaction index variations - producing perturbations in the wavefront of the object we
are inspecting. As a consequence the light, instead of focusing in a definite image,
is distributed in a larger and irregular surface in which the desired informations and
details are substantially lost. This is an extremely limiting problem for free-space
communications, and it implies critical issues which are really difficult to solve in
modern systems. The incentive connected to the problem of turbulence is thus to
determine an innovative technique allowing to exceed this dilemma in an elegant and
ingenious way.
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4.2 The intuition behind the experiment
So far, the approach that was used to stem the atmospherical turbulence problem
required to correct and remove its detrimental effects, attempting to leverage the
long distance communication systems. To this purpose, in the last decates, a rose of
investigative discipline has been developed beside the classical astrophysics, attemp-
ting to study the nature of optical turbulence and how it acts on wavefronts: the
intent is to measure the perturbations and correct them. These techniques are called
Adaptive Optics and their aim is made of two steps: in the first one the wavefront
perturbations are evaluated grounding on dedicated sensors, while in the second one
an equally but opposite deviation is imposed with the purpose of rebuild the original
configuration. Nevertheless, these methods have a lot of limitations: first at all, they
can only compete -even if with accurate techniques- against a troublesome entity as
the turbulence, that can easily annihilate the effectiveness of transmission.
Therefore, following the more brilliant principle for which: the best way to conquer
an enemy is to become good friends, a new approach gets ahead thanks to the intuition
of Capraro, Tomaello, Dall’Arche, Gerlin, Ursin, Vallone and Villoresi in the paper
“Impact of Turbulence in Long Range Quantum and Classical Communications”
[29]: in this work an hardy proposal is presented, that is, the turbulence is no more
struggled or limited, but rather it is exploited. The amazing result is that potentially
it is possible to complete successfully a key exchange even in loath conditions, in
which by convention it would not be possible to complete a secure communication
successfully.
The ingenious idea behind this new approach is connected to the fact that, when
we have a turbulent channel, the statistics is transformed from Poissonian to Log-
normal. The latter presents intensity peaks that are much more prominent and
noticeable than the former. The intuition is thus to exploit this transmissivity peaks
for cryptography: a channel with constant transmissivity presents a poissonian sta-
tistics; this is not the case of a free-space channel, in which the transmissivity is
variable, and for this reason recurrently we have high peaks of intensity, because the
presence of turbulence contribute to create a sort of channel-effectiveness concentra-
tion phenomena, that can be exploited in order to obtain secure key even in noisy
conditions. In the following we will analyze the detail and theoretical fundamental
of this approach, and we will expose the experiment built up with the purpose of
evaluating in practical term if and when the application of this innovative approach
allows the creation of secure key even in situation considered unusable until now.
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4.3 Theoretical model and realization
When the channel experiences a strong turbulence, it undergoes an increase of tra-
smitted photons losses and hence an increase of the malicious consequences of noise:
with the purpose of evaluating the quality of communications and the possibility to
approach unlocked transmission distances, it is required to understand the effects of
turbulence on propagation, and the statistics of the received information.
We already know from theory that the probability p(n) of counting n photons in
a time interval [t0, t0 + T ] -where T is the counting interval- follows the poissonian
expression [30]:
p(n) =
qn
n!
e−q (4.1)
In fact, we can experimentally see that the photon counting distribution at the
laser transmitter is found to be accurately described by the poisson distribution.
Nevertheless, at the receiver the situation changes radically: the presence of tur-
bulence induces fluctuations on q, the mean photon number in a counting interval
at the receiver. Furthermore, q will decrease due to Rayleigh scattering; because of
all this effects, we disclose the formula describing the probability distribution for q:
P (p) =
1
q
√
2piσ2
e−
[ln( q〈q〉)+12σ2]
2
2σ2 (4.2)
where 〈q〉 is the average, and σ2 = ln(1 + SI) = ln
(
1 + ∆q
2
〈q〉2
)
, SI being the
scintillation index.
We can obtain this formula by partitioning the length-L propagation path into
a large number of sections N , each of which is of length ∆z, and assuming that the
effect of consecutive sections on the intensity is multiplicative, so we can write:
I = I0
N∏
j=1
e−α∆zTj = aI0
N∏
j=1
Tj (4.3)
where:
 I0 is the intensity at z = 0
 I is the intensity at z = L
 a = e−αL is the transmission coefficient associated with scattering and absorp-
tion.
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 Tj Characterizes the turbulence effect on intensity in the j − th section.
Similarly, we can rewrite:
ln
[
I
aI0
]
=
N∑
j=1
ln(Tj) (4.4)
in such a way that, reversing the previous formula, we get:
I = aI0e
χ (4.5)
where χ is the value
∑N
j=1 ln(Tj), i.e. a quantity containing the intensity fluc-
tuations; from the assumed statistical indipendence of Tj and from the central limit
theorem, it follows that the probability distribution of χ is Gaussian:
P (χ) =
1√
2piσχ2
e
− [χ−〈χ〉]2
2σχ2 (4.6)
As a consequence, recalling the relation (4.5) between I and χ, we obtain:
P (I) =
1
I
√
2piσχ2
e
− [
ln( I〈I〉)+12σχ2]
2
2σχ2 (4.7)
From this result we can deduce the evolution on P (q), which in fact follows a
log-normal distribution.
The main conclusion is therefore that the initial equation (4.1) represents the pro-
bability of counting n photons in the interval T if q -that is, the mean photon number
in a counting interval- is fixed. Nevertheless, in realistic situations q fluctuates due
to the presence of atmospheric turbulence, and as a consequence the probability of
detecting n photons in each interval does not follows the poissonian statistics, but
instead it matches the Mandel distribution:
p(n) =
∫ ∞
0
dq
qn
n!
e−qP (q) (4.8)
The previous argument and results, introduced in [30] have been strongly sup-
ported by the experimental foundings formalized in [29]. This experiment, realized
in September 2011, is the fundamental basis for the subsequent investigation of June
2012, which data have been post-processed and analyzed in this thesis, in order to
get an experimental proof on the feasibility of the exploiting-turbulence approach.
Both experiments have been carried out in the Canary archipelagos, by studing the
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propagation on a free-space optical link between La Palma island (the transmitter
were positioned at the Jacobus Kapteyn Telescope) and Tenerife, which lodged the
receiver at the Optical Ground Station (OGS). The distance covered by the optical
link was 143 km.
The data acquired at the receiver in the 2011 experiment have been narrowly
worked out, with the aim of evaluate the scintillation of the beam and analyze the
statistics of arrival of the incoming photons: an illustration of the results is shown
in the following, where the counting occurrences and the correspondent log-normal
distribution are plotted [29]:
Figure 4.1: Temporal distribution of count occurrences and corresponding lognormal
and Mandel curves. The green line corresponds to the Poissonian distribution that
would be obtained without turbulence [29].
By comparing the log-normal distribution with the poissonian, which should have
been obtained if there was no turbulence, we stress what we have previously argued:
in a free-space channel the presence of turbulence implies a transformation of the
statistics from Poissonian to Log-normal. This means, as can be seen from Figure
4.1, that the channel unveils a huge number of intensity peaks, that could be suitably
exploited in order to obtain secure key even in critical situations, that generally would
inhibit the correct realization of this process. This is the case of strong turbulence
and high noise status, when we want to take advantage of considering only the
particular moments in which the turbulence increase the transmettivity. This should
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be done in order to exploit turbulence to improve the Signal to Noise Ratio: following
the principle proposed in [29], it is possible to enhance the SNR of a long distance
free-space transmission by probing the channel using a classical signal (that in the
following we will call Probe signal). This will give some information about the
instantaneous transmission of the channel: if and only if this signal is above a given
threshold, the photon signal is acquired. So it is essential to find a suitable Thresold
to be used in order to realize this implementation. Moreover, it was shown in [29]
that, if we take under consideration only the events in which the transmission is
above a given threshold, that is T > T0, then the mean number of detected photons
becomes:
〈n〉thres
〈n〉 =
1− erf
[
ln
T0
〈T 〉− 12σ2√
2σ2
]
1− erf
[
ln
T0
〈T 〉+
1
2
σ2√
2σ2
] > 1 (4.9)
where erf(x) is the Gaussian error function.
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The previous result implies that, by means of a suitable threshold, we have an
increase of the SNR, but at the same time we have a decrease of the overall counts
in a given time, as can be seen by the following figure:
Figure 4.2: SNR and percentage of the overall counts that will be detected as a
function of the threshold [29].
From this we can see that, in cases of strong turbulence and high noise, the
introduction of a suitable threshold can be a successful techniques in order to support
the qubit transmission by exploiting turbulence.
This theoretical model and the correspondent experimentation at the Canary
islands are the indispensable basis as well as the starting point for this thesis: the
data acquired in the experiment have been fully processed and analyzed by means of
suitable Matlab code (Chapter 5 ), and the amazing results are presented (Chapter
6 ).
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5 | The analysis and design of the
system
In this chapter we will illustrate the building blocks that have been implemented
with the aim to process the data acquired during the experiment: the treatment are
divided into topics in order to clarify the main steps. Therefore, we will deal with
Probe Signal processing in Section 5.1, and with Key Signal processing in Section
5.2, while Section 5.3 is dedicated to the Alignment of data and Section 5.4 is for
Data processing and Optimal Threshold evaluation.
The main relevant elements for this study are the Probe signal and the Key
signal: we stress that the goal is to enlight the possibility of reducing the final key
rate at the receiving side by setting a so called Probe Threshold (that is, the value
of the probe signal whereunder we do not acquire the key signal) and that this can
be done in two different manners:
 Hardware, that is, by imposing a Probe Physical Threshold in advance;
 Software, that is, by evaluating an Optimal Threshold based on the analysis
of the available data.
The QBER at the receiver side can benefit of this mechanism in the peculiar cases
in which the background is particularly high. In Figure 5.1 we can see the setup of the
experiment, with the transmitter, located at the Jacobus Kapteyn Telescope at La
Palma, and the receiver, positioned at the Optical Ground Station of Tenerife. The
transmitter uses two infrared attenuated diode lasers at a wavelength of 850 nm in
order to send 0 and 1, where 0 is encoded in the vertical polarization of the photon,
(|l〉) and 1 is encoded in the +45o linear polarization (|↗〉). We also transmit
the probe signal at a wavelength of 808 nm; at the receiver side, a dichroic mirror
is needed to separate the probe signal from the information qubits: the former is
detected by an avalanche photodiode, while the latter encroaches onto a 50/50 beam
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splitter. At either output of the beam splitter, we have a polarizer and a single
photon avalanche photodiode (SPAD) for the detection of the −45o linear (〈↖|)
or horizontal (〈↔|) polarization photons. Each click on either SPAD bears the
reception of a sifted 0 or 1, respectively [31].
Probe 
laser  
FPGA  
dichroic 
APD  
Beam splitter 
Polarizer 
Polarizer 
SPAD  
SPAD  
FPGA  
GPS  GPS  
Laser Laser 
 0  1 
Polarizer Polarizer 
Figure 5.1: Setup of the experiment.
In order to fully clarify the role of each signal in the following elaborations,
we need to introduce the main elements of this system, and the peculiarities that
distinguish them.
 The Probe signal: as was disclosed in the previous chapter, the probe si-
gnal is a classical signal with a wavelength of 808 nm and is sampled at the
r3eceiver with a Tinterval = 26 µs. Thus, it is a one minute-sequence of impulses
for each acquisition, and it is used as a reference to evaluate the state of the
channel: the idea is to probe the channel and exploit that information, mainly
in conditions of strong turbulence and high noise status, when we want to take
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advantage of considering only the specific moments in which the turbulence
increase the transmettivity. When acquiring the signal, the majority of tran-
smissions an hardware threshold -the so called Probe Physical Threshold - has
been established in advance. This threshold has a variable value depending on
the acquisition, and it is a sort of physical limit on the intensity of the probe
signal, in the sense that under that value the keys have not been saved during
the acquisition.
 The Key signal: each transmission consists of a sequence of raw keys, each
one transmitted during an interval Tk = 1s. Each key is composed by 625
raw packets, and the packet period is Tp = 1.6 ms; neverthless, in order
to overcome some FPGA limitations, we have to take only one packet out
of ten, thus the actual maximum number of sifted packets per key will be
63. The signal wavelength is 850 nm: this value is different enough from the
probe wavelength so that we don’t need to deal with interference problems,
but sufficiently close to allow us to assume that the behaviour of the channel
observed by using the probe signal is coherent with the conditions experienced
by the key signal. Such assumption will be confirmed by the results in Chapter
6.
The following sections are dedicated to the fundamental functions that have been
implemented in order to process and analyse the data gathered during the Canary
Island experiment. In order to facilitate a complete comprehension of the subsequent
dissertations, we propose a diagram in which all the main functions implemented for
the analysis are presented. For the sake of clarity, Table 5.1 defines the function
acronyms, so that the diagram can specify the function dependences by using them.
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Acronym Function name
AK AnalyseKey
AP AcquisitionParameters
BAP BeforeAfterAlignmentPlots
CA CheckAlignment
CMNC ComputeMeanNumberOfClicks
CQ ComputeQBER
ELK expLkey
FBC findBackgroundClicks
FPOT fixProbeOffThreshold
FPP FalsePositivePlots
FSKP findStarting key pkt
GA getAlignment
GCC getCorrCoef
GCE getChannelEstimation
GER getErrorRate
GET Q getExpectedTheoreticalQBER
GPD getProbeDistribution
KAL KEY alignment
KRP keyRatePrediction
PKA ProbeKeyAnalysis
PK PrepareKey
PPD pruneProbeData
PS ProbeSelection
RIP ReshapeIntoPKT
SQP Secret QBERPlots
Table 5.1: Function acronyms
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PKA
GET Q
FBC
CMNC
SQP GPD
AP
PPD FPOT
PS
GPD
PK
AK
RIP
CQ
KAL PS
BAP
AP
PS
CA
GA FSKP
GER
PS
FPP
GCCGCE
KRP
PS
ELK
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5.1 Probe Signal processing
The first result needed for the analysis is a suitable elaboration of the probe signal.
This element is indispensable because it gives informations about the state of the
channel, intending to exploit this knowledge with regard to the key signal and the
possibility to enhance the quality of our final secret transmission. The probe signal
needs to be aligned with the key signal, in order to evaluate the correlation between
probe samples and the number of sifted bits. That’s why the probe signal has to be
processed conscientiously, and the functions in charge for that are presented in the
subsequent sections.
5.1.1 pruneProbeData
This function loads the probe signal of the acquisition under consideration and ela-
borates it in the following way:
 identifies the instants for which a suitable GPS signal, used as an initial refe-
rence and plotted in Figure 5.2, is greater than 3 Volts, and derives the step
needed in order to pursue its rising edges. The value of Tinterval is then adjusted
according to that GPS reference.
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Figure 5.2: GPS reference signal
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 pruneProbeData also defines the probeOffThreshold, that is, the threshold whe-
reunder the probe values are esteemed to be not denotative and are thus di-
scarded.
 The probe signal is suitably sampled with a sampling period of 1.6 ms, which is
the period of the laser pulses, for subsequent comparisons with the key signal.
The result is depicted in Figure 5.3.
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Figure 5.3: Continuous and sampled probe comparison.
5.1.2 ProbeSelection
This function allows different elaborations of the probe signal, depending on the
more suitable version required by each calling function. Unless otherwise needed,
the saturation value is set to the maximum value of probe detected in the current
acquisition. If a physical threshold is imposed for the recovery of the correspondent
key packets, the probe values under this threshold can be discarded. With reference
to this circumstance, an opportune tolerance interval can be set to deal with the no-
nidealities of measurement instrumentations. Furthermore, we have the possibility
to neglect the probe samples for which the probe signal is lower than probeOffThre-
shold for at least one second. In fact, we have forcedly introduced some one-second
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recovery holes, with the purpose of simplify the alignment between probe signal and
key signal. This expedient permits to guarantee a meticulous alignment, as it enables
to precisely align the probe sample and its corresponding key packet.
To clarify the functionalities, these elaborations have been divided into five dif-
ferent probe-processing modes:
 Mode n.1
– delete probe signal if lower than probeOffThreshold for one second
 Mode n.2
– delete probe signal if lower than probeOffThreshold for one second
– Discard all the values lower than probePhyThreshold, by taking into ac-
count the instrumental tolerance.
 Mode n.3
– Set the saturated probe values to a suitable Saturation value
 Mode n.4
– delete probe signal if lower than probeOffThreshold for one second
– Set the saturated probe values to a suitable Saturation value
 Mode n.5
– delete probe signal if lower than probeOffThreshold for one second
– Set the saturated probe values to a suitable Saturation value
– Discard all the values lower than probePhyThreshold, by taking into ac-
count the instrumental tolerance.
For the sake of clarity, in Figure 5.4 we show a comparison between Mode
n.3 (where there is no elaboration except the imposition of a saturation value) and
Mode n.5, in which, additionally, the probe values lower than probeOffThreshold
for at least one second are deleted, and the values lower than probePhyThreshold
are discarded.
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Figure 5.4: Probe selection mode comparison.
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5.1.3 getProbeDistribution
The function getProbeDistribution performs the statistical analysis of the overall
probe data and plots the corresponding empirical distribution. The blue line repre-
sents the empirical computation of the probe original data distribution, while the red
line is the lognormal curve best fitting the data, obtained by finding - via maximum
likelihood estimation - the parameters µ and σ of the lognormal probability density
function:
f(x) =
1
x
√
2piσ2
e−
(log x−µ)2
2σ2 (5.1)
The green line is obtained by evaluating the meanM and variance V directly from
data. As µ and σ depend on the mean and variance of the lognormal distribution,
we can compute these parameters by using the following formula:
M = e
(
µ+σ
2
2
)
, V = e(2µ+σ2)(eσ2 − 1) (5.2)
Exploiting the mean and variance computed from the original data, we can then
reverse the previous formula and find µ and σ, that in turn could be used to pro-
cess the lognormal distribution, as in (5.1). The comparison between the curves is
presented below. As a further validation of what has already been pointed out in
the previous chapter, we can see that the channel statistics follows the log-normal
distribution with high fidelity.
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Figure 5.5: Probability distribution function and cumulative distribution function
for the probe signal.
5.2 Key Signal processing
We have already underlined that one of the fundamental elements for this experiment
is, obviously, the Key signal. This component has been conveniently processed,
thanks to the functions introduced below, in order to extrapolate the main results
of this analysis.
5.2.1 PrepareKey
This function represents the first component of the transmission processing proce-
dure: for each acquisition, prepareKey provides the number of sifted Key and give
them a corresponding identification code; these elements are mandatory for subse-
quent elaborations.
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5.2.2 AnalyseKey
This function performs the analysis and processing of the key, by calling different
sub-functions, such as:
 ReshapeIntoPKT
 ComputeQBER
ReshapeIntoPKT
Each key is stored in a single file where we have recorded the correspondent sifted
bit sequence. We thus need to process the sifted key bits sequence of the overall
transmission, and to reorganize them into the corresponding packets. In order to do
that, we choose to create a matrix for each Sifted Key of the analysed transmission, in
which each column identifies a single packet, and its elements are the correspondent
packet bits. This function acts as follow:
 the function takes the sifted key bits at the receiver and reshapes them into
a matrix (ycell{i}), where i is the index of the Sifted Key under consideration,
with one column for each packet.
 nsift is a vector with the number of sifted bits in each packet of the current
Sifted Key. The matrix ycell{i} has a number of rows which is equal to the ma-
ximum value between the element of nsift; if a packet has less than max(nsift)
sifted bits, the corresponding column is padded with NaNs
 xcell{i} is a matrix with the same size as ycell{i}, which elements are the cor-
responding sifted bits at the transmitter. This is done with the purpose of
allowing a subsequent comparison between transmitted and received sifted bits.
ComputeQBER
This function finds the number of errors and error rate for each packet and for the
whole key. The inputs are xcell{i} and ycell{i}, the matrices of sifted bits by Alice
and Bob respectively, for the key under consideration, and nsift, the vector with the
number of sifted bits in each packet. With this information, the function computes:
 nerr, a vector for the current key with the number of bit errors in each packet.
 Qberpkt, a vector with the errors rate in each packet, for each key.
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According to the elements defined in these sections, and going back to the cal-
ling function AnalyseKey, we can formalize the global variables related to the keys
composing the overall transmission. Therefore we introduce:
 QBP , a matrix in which each row represents a key, and each column a packet.
It was chosen to consider the maximum number of packets per keys as the
overall number of columns, and to pad with NaNs the possibly void spots
corresponding to keys for whom the number of packets was lower that that
maximum value. The element (i, j) corresponds to the error rate for the j–th
packet of the i–th key, for the current transmission.
 Nsift is again a matrix in which every row represents a key, and every column
a single packet, following a criterion similar to that of QBP ; in this case the
element (i, j) represents the number of sifted bits for the j–th packet of the
i–th key, in the current transmission.
 Nerr is a matrix which dimensions are analogous to the previous, where the
element (i, j) corresponds to the number of bit errors for the j–th packet of
the i–th key.
Additionally, the function AnalyseKey processes the elaboration of two multi-
dimensional matrices, ALICEsifted bits and BOBsifted bits: these are tridimensional
matrices, corresponding to the sifted bits of the overall transmission, that is, they
are related to the global set of keys for the current acquisition. The former is as-
sociated with the transmitter side, while the latter identifies the receiver side; the
third dimension is necessary in order to represent each key. Therefore, each key can
be seen as a distinguished bidimensional matrix, in which each column represents a
packet, and each row represents the i–th bit of the j–th packet, correspondent to the
k–th key. In Figure 5.6 we can see a schematic representation of this criterion:
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Figure 5.6: Multidimensional representation of ALICEsifted bits structure.
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5.3 Alignment of data
In this section we will describe the procedure for the alignment of the probe and key
signal, in order to realize a meticulous comparison between matching probe samples
and packets.
5.3.1 KEY alignment
This function aligns sifted data and probe signal basing on transmission one second-
holes. It has been already emphasized that this alignment needs to be done with
a precision below 1 ms, as each second of probe has to fit in extremely well with
the correspondent key, in order to evaluate their consistency. The outputs of this
function are:
 tok, which is the alignment shift;
 the matrix tp, where the element (i, j) represents the starting time of the j–th
packet of the i–th sifted key;
 tsift, which is the alignment time axis for the sifted key, realized by adding to
the first reference of tp -and for each key- the correct shift value tok. Therefore,
tsift is a column vector, which i–th element corresponds to the time instant
related to the beginning of the i–th key of the current transmission, after the
suitable shift.
We need the following parameters:
 ts, which is the time axis for the sampled probe signal Ds;
 Nsift, the matrix already presented in the previous section, in which the element
(i, j) corresponds to the number of sifted bits in the j–th packet of the i–th
sifted key;
 Jump = 10, which is the packet decimation factor due to FPGA problems;
 Tp, the packet interval;
 Npktraw, correspondent to the number of packets per raw key;
 maxdelay which is the maximum alignment error that can be corrected during
implementation.
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Aligning is performed automatically basing on the minimum of the correlation
between the sifted bit data and a binary mask based on missing blocks of probe data.
In Figure 5.7 we can clearly see the results of this alignment procedure:
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Figure 5.7: Result of the alignment procedure implemented by KEY alignment.
5.3.2 checkAlignment
The main outputs of this function are the matrices tkm, Dsm, Nsm, where -once
again- each row represents a specific key of the acquisition under consideration, while
each column corresponds to a packet of the i–th key. Therefore, the element (i, j) of
tkm is filled with the specific temporal instant related to the j–th packet of the i–th
key, while the element (i, j) of Dsm, Nsm includes respectively the value of probe
and the number of sifted bits matched to the j–th packet of the i–th key.
The sub-function getAlignment, called by checkAlignment, performs a further
refined alignment, no no longer of each key but now on each packet, in order to
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get the correspondent probe value for each of them. This is crucial to evaluate the
consistency between different values of probe and the equivalent number of acquired
sifted bits. To implement this procedure, we exploit the probe temporal axis ts as
a reference: for every element of ts, we check if that instant is matched with a time
istant of the sifted packets. If so, we take the ts–index of that instant and record it:
this will be used to get the correspondent elements of Ds. If the transmission (see
as a concatenation of packets) and the probe signal have different temporal length,
then only the common temporal interval wil be considered for the analysis.
The sub-function getErrorRate processes the probe values and the number of
sifted bits for each packet; the aim is to establish a rate of valid acquisition according
to the following criterion: if the current transmission has required the establishment
of a Probe Physical Threshold, then we already know from the above that we need
to check if the acquisition of a packet has been catched when the probe value was
over that threshold (remind that we can impose a suitable instrumental tolerance if
needed). If this is not the case, then we can have two different anomalous cases:
 the packet acquisition in a specific instant has snapped even if the probe value
was under the Probe Physical Threshold : this case is called a false positive;
 the probe values of the sample under consideration was over the Probe Physical
Threshold, but we do not acquired any key signal: this case is labeled as a
missed acquisition.
In turn, we have a so called valid acquisition when, for a specific time instant,
the value of probe was over the Probe Physical Threshold, and we acquired the key
properly. The count of this records for each packet of the global transmission allows
to determine a valid acquisition rate RV A according to the following formula:
RV A =
no of valid acquisitions
total no of acquisitions
(5.3)
The value of RV A is very close to unit for most of the transmissions, as a further
demonstration that there was a good correspondence between probe and key packet
during the acquisition mechanism.
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5.4 Data processing and Optimal Threshold eva-
luation
This section represents the core of the overall analysis, as the functions described
beyond provide the computation of the quantities such as the Optimal Threshold
that allow us to derive the results that will be presented in Chapter 6.
5.4.1 KeyRatePrediction
The main purpose of the processing realized by this function, is to evaluate if it is
possible to obtain a tangible benefit from the thresholding: recalling what has been
introduced in the previous chapter regarding the imposition of an optimal threshold,
we desire to see if that Optimal Threshold -that is, a suitable probe value for which
it is possible to obtain a largest number of secret key bits, or to realize secret key
even in conditions that generally would not allow that- actually exists. Therefore, we
need to determine the probe value for which we have the maximum number of secret
bits and, if this optimal probe value is different from the Probe Physical Threshold
imposed during the acquisition, we save this value in a suitable vector, one for each
transmission. In particularly critical conditions of high background, we will see that
a significant increase in the number of secret bits is effectively possible, by imposing
the suitable value of optimal threshold. Additionally, we will emphasize that in some
specific cases the improvement is not only in the number of secret bits, but rather it
lies in the fact that without the optimal threshold it wouldn’t be possible to share a
secret key, while the introduction of this new expedient allow us to make the secret
key exchange possible.
The main task of KeyRatePrediction is to process the results on the sifted bits,
secret bits and QBER trends as a function of the values of probe threshold, by calling
the sub-function expLkey, which evaluates the expected key length depending on
the scintillation threshold (and also yields the corresponding sifted key length and
QBER). The outputs are:
 keyBitsThr, a vector containing the bound on the maximum number of final
secret key bits for each threshold thi, computed by using the asymptotic
bound:
Ksec = Ksift(1− 2H(QBER)) (5.4)
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 th, the probe thresholds vector. Unless otherwise specified, for the realization
of this vector all the values of the overall transmission are used, once they have
been duly reorganised in ascending order.
 siftedBitsThr, a vector containing the overall number of sifted bits correspon-
ding to packets for which probe signal is greater than threshold, for each thre-
shold thi
 QberThr, a vector containing the overall QBER corresponding to packets for
which probe signal is greater than threshold, for each threshold thi
The optimal threshold is fixed in correspondence to the value of probe that per-
mits to obtain the maximum value of keyBitsThr, that is the maximum number
of secret bits. KeyRatePrediction supplies the following outputs, needed for the
graphic elaborations and consequent evaluations of Chapter 6 :
MatrixOfValues: the rows of this matrix are representative of the keys in the
current acquisition (just one row if we want to evaluate the overall transmission in a
global way), while each column represents:
 Column n.1 is the number of sifted bits when no threshold has been establi-
shed (in that case the minimum allowed value is the Probe Physical Threshold,
set before the acquisition)
 Column n.2 represents the expected secret key length when no threshold has
been established;
 Column n.3 is the QBER value when no threshold has been established;
 Column n.4 corresponds to the probe signal optimal threshold value, evaluated
in correspondence to the maximum number of secret bits;
 Column n.5 represents the fraction of packets for which the probe signal is
over the optimal threshold value;
 Column n.6 stands for the number of sifted bits related to the established
optimal threshold value;
 Column n.7 is the expected secrey key length related to the established optimal
threshold value;
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 Column n.8 corresponds to the QBER value when the optimal threshold
value has been established.
A further output of the function under consideration is PKTaligncell; it stands
for a cell array which most impressive elements are the following:
 The overall matrix th: it is composed by a number of rows equal to the
number of keys for each acquisition (it is also possible to select the analysis of
the overall transmission, in this case this matrix will have a single row). Each
row contains the probe values considered as thresholds for the investigation.
 The overall matrix Ls, which structure is equivalent to that of th, and in
which rows we record the value of siftedBitsThr computed in expLkey, that is,
the vector containing the overall number of sifted bits corresponding to packets
for which probe signal is greater than threshold, for each threshold thj (where
j is now the column ID).
 The overall matrix Lk, with a structure equal to the previous, in which rows
we set the values of keyBitsThr, that is, the bound on the maximum number
of final secret key bits for each threshold thj.
 The overall matrix Qbth, again with the same number of rows and columns
as the matrices that have been already defined, in which rows we record the
values of QberThr, the vector containing the overall QBER corresponding to
packets for which the probe signal is greater than threshold, for each threshold
thj.
Figure 5.8 shows the sifted and secret key length, the QBER and the average
number of sifted bits per packet, computed over the packets for which the correspon-
dent probe value was greater than thi; all are plotted versus the probe threshold,
within a single transmission in which the level of background noise is high. Each
dot mark represents a single value of QBER or sifted bits related to a single packet,
corresponding to one probe measurement. As expected, by enlarging the threshold
value we suffer for an overall sifted key length decreasing, but in turn we can benefit
of a decrease in the QBER and an increase on the average number of sifted bits per
packet, again as a function of threshold. Furthermore, we can clearly see that the
number of secret key length grows and reaches the maximum value for a suitable
optimal threshold. This results are consistent with our target, that is, to find a
threshold for which the increase of the SNR overcomes the sifted bit decreasing, in
such a way that the overall secret key length benefits from the imposition of that
treshold.
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Figure 5.8: Sifted and Secret key length, QBER and average number of sifted bits
as a function of threshold.
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All these results will be discussed thoroughly and the important conclusions will
be presented in the following. For the sake of completeness, we finally need to intro-
duce the function ProbeKeyAnalysis, that manages the overall processing of data
and the analysis of results. This function has the task to call the previous functions
and sub-functions, to administer the variables and to realise the exemplifying plots
for a graphic evaluation of the main results. This can be done for each acquisition,
while the global analysis of the set of the overall transmissions is committed to an
apposite script, calling ProbeKeyAnalysis for each data capture and recording the
total results in order to compare them and inspect the trends for the various cases. In
conclusion, in this chapter we have presented the basic building blocks implemented
in order to realize the processing of data.
6 | Analysis of results
This chapter is devoted to the disclosure of the remarkable results that have been
obtained from the data analysis described in the previous chapter. The sections
will respectively focus on the probe distribution -Section 6.1 - where we will see
that as expected it follows a typical lognormal statistics, and on the consistency
between Probe and Key signal -Section 6.2 - in which an interesting parallelism
between probe signal and key signal is presented. Section 6.3, Section 6.4 and
Section 6.5 are devoted to the sifted key length, QBER and secret key length
respectively, and we will see that an important validation of our threshold-proposal
for the improvement of the quality of transmission and secret key exchange can be
drawn from this analysis.
6.1 The probe distribution
In the previous chapter we have presented the fundamental results related to the
probe distribution. In this section we will give a further insight and we will clarify
the implications of our probe elaboration. In the introductive chapter it was pointed
out that, so far, the main obstacle related to free-space propagation was the presence
of atmospherical turbulence, and that as a consequence the statistics of the received
signal amplitude is transformed from Poissonian to Lognormal. If this is the case,
then the peculiar transmissivity peaks related to a lognormal distribution can be
exploited in order to obtain secure key even in bad conditions. The analysis of the
probe data for the overall acquisitions clearly shows that the lognormal behaviour is
confirmed (see Figure 6.1 ).
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Figure 6.1: CCDF of the probe signal, sampled at 1.6 ms, for three different tran-
smission sessions. The lognormal CCDF is also shown for comparison.
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This result is important because it allows us to process the trasmission data with
the aim to test the feasibility of our turbulence exploitation. Therefore, due to the
lognormal statistics of the channel we expect a few intensity peaks. In conclusion,
we have validated the correctness of the lognormal-distribution hypothesis for our
channel: this means that we are dealing with a situation in which our turbulence
exploiting approach is viable, as the intensity peaks caused by turbulence can in
principle allow a quality enhancement of secure transmissions.
6.2 The consistency between Probe and Key si-
gnal
This section is devoted to the comparison between probe and key signal samples, with
the aim to validate the correspondence between high probe values, and a high count
of bits in the related packet of information. In Figure 6.2 we can see qualitatively
how this consistency is actually confirmed by the experimental results: lower values
of the probe signal correspond to fewer counts for the acquisition, and viceversa.
Figure 6.2: Consistency between probe signal and acquisition counts.
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We recall that our aim was to exploit the information obtained thanks to the
observation of the probe signal in order to catch instants of high transmettivity and
acquire the correspondent key signal. At the basis of this formulation there was the
hypothesis that the probe and key signal experience the same channel status, so that
instants of high probe values match instants of high counts in the key signal. This
correspondence allows us to validate the intuition expressed at the very beginning
of our dissertation: we can probe the channel by means of a classical signal, and
exploit that information to acquire the photon signal if and only if the probe value
is above a given threshold; this in fact guarantees that the collected signal will have
a correspondent higher number of counts, and an enhanced SNR.
6.3 Sifted key length with probe threshold
The first thing we need to observe about the sifted key length is that its behaviour as
a function of threshold is in itself decreasing. This is because we are only considering
the acquisitions of packets for which the probe signal was above a given threshold,
and this selection causes the overall number of sifted key bits to lower down, as we
will have a decrease of the counts in a given time. Neverthless, we would like to
see whether there is a consequent global benefit on imposing a threshold. We can
recognize this improvement by observing the behaviour of the average number of
sifted bits per packet as a function of threshold (Figure 6.3 ): this value grows with
the threshold (at least up to the mean received probe amplitude). This result reveals
that as a matter of fact the threshold imposition implies a SNR enhancement and a
consequent increase of the average number of sifted bits per packet, concurrent with
an enrichment of the overall performances of the system; this is because thresholding
involves a decreasing of the overall counts, but as they are accurately selected they
appear to be qualitatively excelling. The following figure shows an example of average
number of sifted bits per packet’s growth for a transmission that we will take as a
reference in the following: it corresponds to the acquisition carried out on June 18th,
at 03:14 a.m. in conditions of high background and strong noise status, that is,
perfectly matching with our presuppositions and requirements.
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Figure 6.3: Average number of sifted bits per packet, correspondent to values of
probe greater than threshold (x axis).
As a further element of appraisal, we evalutated the normalized trend of the
average number of sifted bits per packet for a given set of acquisitions, as a function
of the normalized threshold; the factor of normalization is the mean value of the
overall probe signal. Additionally, we propose a polynomial fitting of second degree
for these trends, with the aim to evaluate the parameter’s progression with further
accuracy; both plots are depicted in Figure 6.4.
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Figure 6.4: Average number of sifted bits per packet trend, and 2nd-degree fitting
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The main conclusion that can be deduced is thus that a suitable threshold esta-
blishment allows an improvement and a growth of the average sifted bits per packet,
as a further validation of the fact that the threshold imposition corresponds to a
SNR enhancement and thus the quality of the acquisition is in inself improved. For
comparative purpose we propose a photo sequence that characterizes the background
and brightness conditions for three of the acquisitions previously considered (Figure
6.6-6.8 ).
Figure 6.5: Background and brightness conditions at 06:27 a.m.
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Figure 6.6: Background and brightness conditions at 06:41 a.m.
Figure 6.7: Background and brightness conditions at 06:50 a.m.
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6.4 QBER with probe threshold
In this section we will examine the QBER behaviour as a function of threshold.
In order to verify what was claimed in the previous section, we would like to see
that we have a concrete benefit on the SNR and on the overall transmission quality,
thanks to the thresholding approach, by checking for a QBER decrease. Figure 6.8
definitely shows that, in condition of particularly high background, this improvement
is effectively possible: as the threshold grows -provided that its value is reasonable-,
we can see a clear decreasing in the QBER parameter.
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Figure 6.8: Quantum BER as a function of threshold.
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6.5 Secret key length with probe threshold
We have already pointed out in section 6.3 that the sifted key length as a function of
threshold will necessarily experiences a decrease, since we intentionally take into con-
sideration only the packets correspondent to probe values greater than the threshold
established. Neverthless, we have in turn underlined that we have a consequential
growth of the average number of sifted bits per packet, following a SNR enhance-
ment and an improvement of performances and quality of the system. Figure 6.9
shows that the sifted key length effectively decrease with threshold, but in turn we
can see an astonish result: in conditions of high background and high noise status,
the asymptotic bound on the secret key length achivable from the system can expe-
rience a maximum peak in correspondence to a suitable value of threshold named
optimal threshold. Furthermore, in this peculiar case we can see that the number
of resulting secret bits was zero when no threshold was imposed, while the threshold
set up involves the amazing possibility of obtaining a considerable amount of secret
bits from the secret key exchange, that was previously unfeasible and inconceiva-
ble. This is a stunning result, because it validate what was announced in Section
3.2.3, equation (3.10): by selecting only the transmissions with low QBER -thanks
to thresholding-, we guarantee that the QBER decreasing overcomes the sifted bits
loss, in order to obtain an overall enhancement of the secret key rate. This result
suggests that, with suitable expedients and thanks to the threshold imposition, it is
possible to obtain a secret key exchange even in critical situations of high background
that would generally inhibit its realization.
6.5. Secret key length with probe threshold 85
0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5
103
104
105
bi
ts
SIFTED AND SECRET KEY LENGTHS (18Jun0325)
 
 
L
sift
L
sec
Optimal Threshold
Figure 6.9: Secret and sifted key lengths for a specific acquisition (at 03:25 a.m.).
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The considerations deduced in the previous sections can be gathered in a single
figure in order to evaluate the effect and the importance of the achieved results: we
can clearly see that, in conditions of high background and luminosity, the imposition
of an optimal threshold involves a QBER decreasing and a correspondent increasing
of the secret key length, allowing to realize in principle a satisfying secret key ex-
change even in conditions considered -until now- impossible. With Figure 6.10 we
have a further validation that the SNR decreasing is remarkable enough to compen-
sate the decrease in the number of counts detected, due to the choice of acquiring
only the packets correspondent to probe values greater than the imposed threshold.
This result persuase us to support the idea of the exploiting turbulence approach, and
to propose it as a promising countermeasure for the realization of an efficient secret
key exchange system, even in critical channel situations.
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Figure 6.10: Sifted key length, Secret key length, and QBER trends for acquisition
at 03:14 a.m.
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6.6 The benefits of a threshold establishment
An additional and impressive result can be deduced by comparing the QBER values
observed for acquisitions with high background levels. We have already pointed out
that the threshold can be hardware or software: in the former we imposed a Probe
Physical Threshold in advance, that is a probe value whereunder we do not acquire
any signal -physically speaking-, while in the latter we have subsequently evaluated
an Optimal Threshold based on the analysis of acquired data: the samples beneath
that value have been simply ignored. We will see that the software approach is really
valuable when dealing with transmissions that are not strongly hardware-limited,
while it faces some limitations when used with acquisitions showing a preimposed
high hardware threshold; this is due to the fact that if the hardware probe picking
is significantly selective, we will deal with a restricted amount of key data for the
statistics, as the number of packets over the hardware threshold is itself limited.
The elaborations of data that have been done with the functions presented in
Chapter 5 allow us to fully analyse all transmissions; the most relevant for our pur-
pose are the acquisitions for which the background was sufficiently high: this is
because we can emphasize the benefits of imposing a threshold when the SNR can
be enhanced, thus when the QBER presents initial high values that we are trying
to improve. Therefore, in the following we will deal with transmissions that have
experienced substantial background noise conditions, and for which the preimposed
hardware threshold was not excessively high. For these acquisitions, Figure 6.11
shows a comparison between the starting QBER values (that is, the values without
software thresholding, but with a possibly hardware preimposed threshold), repre-
sented by yellow dots, and the optimal QBER values, corresponding to the Optimal
probe threshold value and evaluated by finding the maximum on the secret key
length (blue dots). The first acquisitions are representative of a situation in which
the QBER value at the very beginning is already low, so that we cannot experience
any threshold-based improvement; nevertheless, for the subsequent recoveries we can
foresee two interesting results.
1. For our first observation we will consider acquisitions with the same background
conditions (characterized by a background identification that have been recor-
ded during the recovery of data) such as:
 18Jun0325
 18Jun0328
 18Jun0329
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 18Jun0331
The first transmission shows a very low hardware thresholding (40 mV ), while
the subsequent are much more significant (500 mV and 1 V ): by comparing
the yellow dots, that is, the starting QBER values obtained by only imposing
an hardware threshold, we can clearly see that the QBER benefits from that,
as the SNR grows if we impose a selective acquirement of packets. Selection
means that we acquire a lower number of packets (when the probe is above
the hardware threshold), but the quality of the samples is enhanced; thus,
the QBER value slows down. Nevertheless, we remark that an exaggerated
hardware-threshold value causes the statistics for the current acquisition to be
not significant (as we do not acquire enough samples to consider them for a
reliable statistics).
2. Another impressive conclusion can be deduced by observing the impact of soft-
ware thresholding : we shall compare yellow dot with blue dot for each aquisi-
tion, where the former specifies the QBER value without software thresholding
(eventually with an hardware one), while the latter define the QBER value
after a suitable optimal software thresholding, where the optimal threshold is
computed in correspondence to the maximum value of the secret key length.
We can clearly see that the software threshold approach, in the same way
as the hardware case, allows to obtain a substantial improvement in the per-
formances of the system. A particular focus is needed to enlighten that, in
cases of particularly high background and noise conditions, for which the initial
QBER values were above the maximum amount allowing a secret key exchange
(QBER = 11%), the threshold imposition permits to decrease the QBER va-
lue of transmission under the 11%, thus allowing to share a secret key even in
conditions for which it was otherwise impossible.
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Figure 6.11: QBER comparison for acquisitions with high background conditions.
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6.7 Conclusions
This work was realized with the aim to evaluate the possibility of implementing
concretely the exploiting turbulence approach of Capraro et al. [29]: we know
that atmospherical turbulence is one of the main problems in long-distance optical
transmissions, and that it may limit the feasibility of secure key exchange between
distant terminals, such as satellites. The amazing result is that we effectively achieve
various benefits, not only in the average amount of sifted bits per packet,
which grows as a validation of the fact that through packets selection we improve
the quality of our acquisitions, but also in the QBER value, which decreases as a
further confirmation of a SNR enhancement. Furthermore, for some trasmissions for
which the QBER value was so high to inhibit key exchange, we shown that -thanks
to a suitable threshold imposition- it is potentially possible to complete successfully
a secret key exchange even in loath conditions, in which otherwise it would not
be possible to accomplish a secure communication. Additionally, we have seen that
in some cases we have a secure key length growth. As a consequence, the quality of
the transmission is enhanced, allowing us to think of exploiting this approach for the
benefit of long-distance transmissions and satellite communications. These results
-and the data processing allowing them- concern the upper bound to expected key
rates: in the follow up work, the analysis will be extended to the finite key regime,
taking into account the need to estimate the channel and its threshold dependent
QBER in a real implementation. At the present stage, the turbulence exploiting
approach is a promising solution that could experience a considerable development
and that embodies the potential to influence the future approach to long-distance
communications techniques.
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